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Executive	Summary		In	France,	spatial	injustice	is	usually	described	as	disadvantages	related	to	place	that	result	 in	 the	 feeling	 that	 the	 local	 population	 is	 left	 out	 or	 unable	 to	 shape	 the	locality’s	own	future.	It	contrasts	with	a	strong	tradition	of	“égalité	des	territoires”	(“equality	between	territories”)	which	shapes	the	spatial	planning	policy.		Two	contrasted	case	studies	have	been	selected	for	the	RELOCAL	project	in	France.		Located	in	peri-urban	post-industrial	contexts,	they	both	need	to	reopen	the	path	towards	 local	 development.	 The	 EPA	 Alzette-Belval	 (Lorraine)	 is	 a	 top-down	initiative	established	through	an	on-site	technical	implementation,	while	Euralens	is	 a	more	 bottom-up,	 autonomous	 association	 in	 the	 Nord	mining	 basin.	 Spatial	injustices	 existed	 in	both	 localities,	 and	 there	were	 a	number	of	 similarities	 (e.g.	access	 to	 and	 financing	 of	 public	 services,	 fair	 and	 equitable	 access	 to	 decision-making	processes).		The	national	context	goes	beyond	the	individual	findings	for	each	case,	to	reflect	on	their	 significance	 in	 a	 national	 context	 shaped	 by	 successive	 waves	 of	decentralisation	 and	 the	 recent	 launch	 of	 nationally	 led	 thematic	 initiatives	 to	support	local	development.	We	found	that	Euralens	and	the	EPA	Alzette-Belval	make	a	direct	contribution	to	greater	 spatial	 justice.	 The	 EPA	 Alzette-Belval	 specifically	 targets	 distributive	justice,	 while	 Euralens	 targets	 procedural	 justice	 more.	 These	 two	 actions	demonstrate	that	despite	decentralisation,	the	state	remains	crucial	in	France.	Like	the	place-based	approach	promoted	at	the	EU	level,	France	encourages	localities	to	build	up	their	own	initiatives	to	foster	local	development,	while	the	state	provides	timely	support	through	dedicated	schemes	(e.g.	ERBM,	ÉcoCité,	EPA	à	la	française).	In	 this	 context,	 regions	 facing	 steep	 challenges	 (e.g.	 economic	 regeneration	following	 the	 fall	 of	 single	 industries,	 asymmetric	 border	 exchanges	 and	interdependencies)	 are	 overwhelmed	 by	 the	 task	 of	 effectively	 mobilising	 the	national	tools	at	their	disposal	and	initiating	local	development	on	their	own.		Nationally	led	instruments	therefore	need	to	be	adapted	to	local	geographic,	political	and	social	specificities	in	order	to	be	capable	of	deploying	their	full	impact.		It	therefore	seems	important	–	especially	in	a	unitary	country	like	France	–	to	keep	monitoring	spatial	disparities	and	social	inequalities,	have	dedicated	channels	for	territories	to	bring	forward	their	respective	problems,	and	as	a	consequence	to	keep	redistributive	measures	that	can	be	mobilised	to	address	the	deepest	territorial	divides.		Too	 often,	 potential	 beneficiaries	 of	 EU	 funding	 do	 not	 apply	 (i.e.	 due	 to	 the	administrative	burden,	lack	of	information).	Access	to	EU	regional	policy	should	be	more	 open,	 simpler	 and	 based	 more	 on	 impact	 (including	 qualitative	 and	quantitative	 indicators).	 Open	 European	 satellites	 with	 dedicated	 agents	 in	territories	facing	structural	challenges	could	contribute	by	enabling	these	regions	and	giving	“Brussels”	a	more	human	and	less	bureaucratic	face.			
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1. Introduction			This	report	provides	 the	national	context	 for	 the	 two	French	case	studies	of	EPA	Alzette-Belval	and	Euralens,	which	share	a	number	of	similarities.	One	is	located	in	the	north	and	one	 in	the	east	of	France.	Post-industrial	(i.e.	mines	and	steel)	and	peri-urban	 (near	 but	 not	 included	 in	 a	 “métropole”),	 these	 territories	 are	characterised	 today	 by	 a	 decline	 in	 the	 productive	 economy	 and	 a	 negative	migration	rate.	In	their	well-known	study,	the	two	French	specialists	in	territorial	economy,	Magali	Talandier	and	Laurent	Davezies,	pointed	out	those	two	regions	as	the	 most	 	 dependent	 on	 transfers	 of	 social	 revenue	 in	 France	 (Davezies,	 2012;	Talandier,	2012).	The	main	difference	is	contextual:	whereas	Luxembourg	borders	the	EPA	Alzette-Belval	 and	drives	most	 of	 its	 economic	 development	 on	 the	 one	hand,	for	the	Euralens	case	study	on	the	other	hand	the	proximity	to	Lille	does	not	directly	benefit	 the	 locality	 so	much.	 In	both	 situations,	we	 investigated	whether	local	development	can	be	genuine,	focusing	in	particular	on	the	role	of	grassroots	organisations	and	that	of	public	institutions.	The	context	of	France	is	particularly	interesting	to	the	RELOCAL	research	questions.		Even	 though	 spatial	 justice	 does	 not	 explicitly	 appear	 in	 public	 policies,	 public	discourses	are	deeply	marked	by	the	notion	and	value	of	equality.	For	Estèbe,	France	has	a	passion	for	the	equality	of	and	between	territories	(L’égalité	des	territoires,	Estèbe,	2015).	This	is	an	important	rationale	for	planning	policies	and	for	thinking	of	the	territory	as	a	nationwide	grid	that	should	be	equipped	with	the	same	access	to	public	 services	 (distributive	 side	of	 spatial	 justice).	 In	 this	 context,	 one	of	 our	research	questions	is	therefore:	do	public	policies	–	striving	for	equality	–	allow	the	pursuit	 of	 a	 greater	 degree	 of	 spatial	 justice?	 Are	 these	 mechanisms	 effectively	‘correcting’	 uneven	 development?	 Ultimately,	 and	 on	 a	more	 philosophical	 note,	how	do	territorial	equality	and	spatial	justice	coexist?	Are	they	the	same	or	do	they	contradict	each	other?	Also,	while	several	public	policies	are	thought	to	rebalance	territories	 and	 inequalities,	 the	unitary	 state	of	 France	has	 gone	 through	 several	waves	of	decentralisation	within	the	last	40	years.	An	important	aspect	to	elucidate	is	therefore	whether	this	supposed	greater	autonomy	allows	greater	spatial	justice	in	its	procedural	dimension.	In	the	traditionally	egalitarian	approach	of	France,	how	do	the	state	and	the	decentralised	authorities	share	responsibilities,	and	what	room	for	manoeuvre	does	the	local	level	effectively	have?		To	 address	 these	 questions,	 we	 have	 selected	 two	 almost	 opposite	 actions	 in	comparable	localities.		
Euralens	 defines	 itself	 as	 a	 “forum	of	 actors	 of	 the	 Pas-de-Calais	mining	 basin1”	(Euralens	website,	2019).	It	covers	a	territory	of	650,000	inhabitants	situated	in	the	north	of	France	between	Lille	and	Paris.	 In	 formal	 terms,	 it	 is	an	association	that	includes	both	politicians	and	public	officers	of	institutions	(1)	and	of	public	agencies	(2),	members	of	 civil	 society	 (3)	and	business	actors	 (4).	The	main	originality	of	Euralens	is	indeed	its	very	nature:	not	being	an	institution	per	se,	 it	has	no	direct	power	of	decision-making.	Nevertheless,	since	it	links	all	the	main	public	and	private	actors	 in	 the	 territory,	 it	constitutes	 itself	as	a	crucial	governance	 tool,	attracting	more	 and	 more	 local,	 national	 and	 international	 attention.	 Created	 in	 2009,	 its	objective	was	(and	still	is)	to	use	the	implementation	of	the	Louvre	satellite	in	Lens	
 1	In	this	report,	when	we	refer	to	the	mining	basin,	we	mean	the	former	Pas-de-Calais	mining	basin.	
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as	 a	 catalyst	 for	 territorial	 development:	 “We	 use	 a	 big	 project	 both	 to	 improve	spatial	 planning	 and	 to	 change	 mentalities”	 (Jean-Louis	 Subileau,	 head	 of	 the	urbanism	agency	assisting	Euralens).	To	do	so,	Euralens	presents	itself	as	a	“local	projects	 incubator”	 (a)	and	a	 “metropolisation	 laboratory”	 (b)	 (Euralens	website,	2019).	 To	 ‘incubate’	 local	 projects	 (a),	 Euralens	 has	 set	 up	 a	 labelling	 process,	reproducing	 the	approach	developed	by	 the	 IBA2	Emscher	Park	 in	 the	Ruhr	area	(Germany).	Through	this,	Euralens	seeks	to	identify,	support	and	catalyse	“example	projects”	 that	 contribute	 to	 “the	 ecological	 and	 social	 transformation	 of	 the	territory”	 (ibid.).	 The	 contribution	 of	 Euralens	 to	 the	 ‘metropolisation’	 of	 the	territory	 occurs	 mainly	 through	 two	 channels.	 Observing	 the	 high	 degree	 of	fragmentation	of	the	territory,	Euralens	constitutes	itself	as	a	large	forum,	crossing	political	 divisions,	 in	 order	 to	 encourage	 cooperation.	 Furthermore,	 due	 to	 the	relatively	small	size	of	the	agglomeration	communities,	territorial	engineering	has	remained	weak.	Not	only	did	the	territory	not	have	a	 large	and	shared	territorial	strategy	at	that	time,	it	was	also	incapable	of	communicating	and	valorising	existing	territorial	 initiatives.	 To	 tackle	 this	 issue,	 Euralens,	 supported	 by	 two	 private	agencies	 involved	 in	 urbanism	and	 landscape,	 has	 established	 a	 list	 of	 priorities,	broken	down	into	annual	thematic	forums.	The	aim	of	this	was	(and	still	is)	to	create	new	territorial	dynamics,	defined	and	put	into	action	by	the	local	actors	together.		The	 EPA	 Alzette-Belval	 is	 a	 state-led	 public	 agency	 in	 charge	 of	 managing	 an	operation	of	national	 interest	 (OIN).	There	are	about	a	dozen	such	operations	 in	France.	Created	under	the	impetus	of	the	French	President	in	2012,	the	EPA	Alzette-Belval’s	long-term	goal	is	to	trigger	local	development	and	regain	strategic	room	for	manoeuvre	in	the	context	of	the	steady	growth	of	Luxembourg,	with	the	declared	aim	of	ultimately	attaining	co-development.	To	do	so,	the	EPA	works	on	three	main	axes:	1)	a	planning	strategy	to	reinforce	local	economic	and	social	attractiveness,	by	improving	 local	 living	 conditions	 of	 the	 existing	 and	 future	 population	 and	 by	developing	public	services	in	the	fields	of	transport	and	housing	in	complementarity	with	 other	 neighbouring	 territories;	 2)	 establishing	 an	 example	 sustainable	 eco-agglomeration	(renovation	and	construction	of	new	buildings);	3)	contributing	to	the	economic	strength	of	northern	Lorraine	by	developing	specific	sectors	(e.g.	the	green	economy)	 in	 complementarity	with	Luxembourg’s	economy	(EPA	Strategic	Operational	 Plan).	 Under	 planning	 law,	 such	 a	 structure	 is	 equipped	 with	 the	capacity	to	take	over	planning	responsibilities	from	the	municipalities	in	order	to	fulfil	 a	 specific	 set	of	 goals.	The	perimeter	of	 the	action	 is	defined	 in	a	decree;	 it	covers	8	peri-urban/rural	municipalities	 (about	28,000	 inhabitants	 in	 total).	The	
action	is	convergent	with	that	of	others	in	Lorraine	seeking	to	rebalance	the	
Lorraine-Luxembourg	 cross-border	 interdependencies.	 Besides	 the	 fact	 that	the	 creation	of	 enterprises	 is	much	 less	 favourable	 and	 simple	 in	France	 than	 in	Luxembourg	 (e.g.	 tax	 system,	 employer	 costs,	 paperwork),	 localities	 close	 to	 the	border	are	more	dependent	on	Luxembourg’s	economy,	as	their	share	of	commuters	can	range	between	50%	and	80%.	As	commuters’	income	tax	is	withheld	at	source	in	Luxembourg,	 these	municipalities	 face	a	peculiar	 situation.	A	 large	part	of	 the	population	works	abroad	(i.e.	on	the	other	side	of	the	border)	while	they	live	in	the	locality.	These	municipalities	need	 to	maintain	a	number	of	public	services	(e.g.	primary	schools,	facilities	to	host	health	care	services,	local	transport	infrastructure,	
 2	Internationale	Bauausstellungen	(German),	which	means	International	Architecture	Exhibitions.	
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support	for	facilities	for	sport	and	cultural	activities)	without	being	able	to	‘tap	into’	a	large	part	of	its	resident	population’s	income	tax.	While	in	a	number	of	other	cross-border	 areas	 (e.g.	 Geneva),	 a	 bilateral	 state	 agreement	 organises	 fiscal	redistribution	 (CPLR,	 2019),	 Luxembourg	 co-finances	 such	 cross-border	infrastructure	on	a	case-by-case	basis.			
	
Map	1:	The	RELOCAL	localities	in	their	national	context	Cartography:	Malte	Helfer,	University	of	Luxembourg		 	
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2. The	case	studies	in	a	national	context	
	
2.1 Unpacking	spatial	justice	in	the	French	context		
In	France,	the	term	“spatial	justice”	is	translated	as	“justice	spatiale”.	From	our	perspective,	 it	 seems	 that	 is	 not	 so	 commonly	 used	 in	 the	 policy	 discourse.	Nevertheless,	 the	 recent	 events	 around	 the	 ‘yellow	 vests’	 movement	 and	 the	publication	 of	 a	 book	 on	 spatial	 justice	 by	 the	 relatively	well-known	 geographer	Jacques	 Levy	 have	 given	 the	 term	 a	 bit	 more	 exposure	 in	 the	 media3.	 Issues	underlying	spatial	justice	are	mostly	addressed	in	public	debates	under	the	heading	of	 inequalities,	 for	which	numerous	studies	are	regularly	published.	For	 instance,	the	“observatory	of	inequalities”	publishes	state-of-the-art	studies	every	year4	–	but	this	does	not	mean	that	the	topic	of	spatial	justice	is	prominent.			
In	most	of	our	interviews,	we	chose	to	use	the	term	of	“spatial	justice”	because	
it	was	part	of	the	description	of	the	project.	We	did	that	at	the	beginning	of	most	of	the	interviews.	Nevertheless,	in	order	to	avoid	any	kind	of	misunderstanding,	we	decided	to	this	term	in	conjunction	with	similar	notions	such	as	social	and	spatial	
inequalities	 (i.e.	 inégalités	 sociales	 et	 spatiales)	 and	 territorial	 disparities	 (i.e.	
disparités	territoriales).	These	terms	are	more	commonly	used	in	the	French	context.	In	the	Euralens	Case	Study	(#18)	and	in	the	EPA	Case	Study	(#17),	we	noticed	that	most	of	the	interviewees	were	more	comfortable	with	the	term	“inequalities”.	Most	
of	the	interviewees	referred	not	only	to	the	social	dimensions	of	inequalities.	As	described	in	the	report,	interviewees	in	the	Euralens	Case	Study	identified	the	spatial	unevenness	of	the	mining	basin	region	in	France	and	in	Europe.	Most	of	them	pointed	out	the	spatial	and	political	dimensions	of	inequalities	first	by	saying,	for	instance:	“Our	region	has	been	abandoned	by	the	French	state”	(A2,	2018)	or,	from	a	more	technical	point	of	view:	“The	mining	basin	is	the	poorest	region	in	France	and	 performs	 poorly	 in	 terms	 of	 any	 kind	 of	 social	 or	 economic	 indicators”	 (P3,	2018).	At	all	levels,	whatever	their	position,	almost	all	interviewees	seem	to	have	embraced	the	term	of	spatial	injustice	as	a	term	referring	to	the	relatively	difficult	situation	of	the	former	Pas-de-Calais	mining	basin	(in	relation	to	poverty,	economic	and	social	development)	in	France	and	in	Europe,	explaining	it	by	the	absence	of	a	political	 plan	 for	 the	 post-mining	 transition.	 Only	 the	 ‘green’	 mayor	 of	 Loos-en-Gohelle	pointed	out	the	temporal	dimension	of	inequalities:		“One	of	the	major	problems	of	the	region	is	also	the	pollution	of	our	soil	and	of	our	water.	The	intensive	mining	exploitation	that	lasted	for	centuries	has	left	our	territory	in	a	terrible	situation,	not	only	because	it	 ceased	 but	 also	 because	 it	 left	 to	 subsequent	 generations	 the	responsibility	to	decontaminate	the	region	and	to	make	it	liveable	for	the	next	generations.”	(2018).		
 3	See	for	instance	the	article	in	Libération,	“Justice	is	first	spatial”	published	on	the	6th	December	2018	by	 Jacques	 levy	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 yellow	 vests	 movement:	https://www.liberation.fr/debats/2018/12/06/la-justice-d-abord-spatiale_1696443,	accessed	20th	May	2019.		4	https://www.inegalites.fr/Publications		
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Some	of	them	(in	particular	inhabitants	and	civil	society)	also	pointed	out	the	social	dimensions	 of	 inequalities,	 for	 example	 in	 terms	 of	 class:	 “Parisian	 elites	 know	nothing	about	 the	problems	of	our	everyday	 lives”	 (A1,	2018).	This	 refers	 to	 the	perception	amongst	several	local	actors	of	a	high	level	of	centralisation	of	power,	namely	 in	Paris	and	 in	Brussels.	This	centralisation	 is	not	seen	as	a	guarantee	of	better	 territorial	 solidarity	 through	 the	 redistribution	of	wealth	 from	 the	 richest	towards	 the	 poorest	 territories,	 as	 the	 political	 elite	 is,	 in	 the	 French	 case,	 often	perceived	by	a	part	of	the	population	as	protecting	its	own	interests	more	than	the	interests	of	the	territory	as	a	whole.	Most	of	the	‘yellow	vests’	movements	refer	to	this	(Confavreux,	2019).	If	some	researchers	such	as	Laurent	Davezies	have	argued	that	 the	redistributive	efforts	 in	France	 towards	 the	poorest	regions	and	poorest	population	is	still	very	significant	(Davezies,	2016),	its	progressive	erosion	and	the	political	 discourse	 (in	 particular	 from	 the	 right-wing	 parties	 and	 from	President	Macron,	targeting	the	poor	as	being	responsible	for	their	poverty5)	have	resulted	in	rising	 distrust	 in	 the	 mining	 basin	 population	 towards	 the	 elite.	 Here,	 spatial	injustice	seems	to	be	viewed	as	a	betrayal	of	the	objective	of	territorial	cohesion,	not	only	in	concrete	terms	but	also	in	discursive	and	performative	terms.	This	way,	it	seems	that	the	local	inhabitants	see	injustice	not	only	in	terms	of	means	but	also	in	terms	of	respect.		In	the	EPA	case	study,	the	national	border	with	Luxembourg	materialises	most	of	the	 inequalities	and	disparities	perceived	by	 the	 interviewees.	 In	 this	case	study,	where	border	crossings	happen	daily	and	for	multiple	practices,	the	border	acts	as	a	 marker	 for	 disparities	 between	 different	 systems.	 “The	 issue	 of	 territorial	
inequalities	is	very	strong,	it	is	palpable.	When	you	go	from	France	to	Luxembourg,	you	
are	really	in	quite	different	worlds,	which	translates	into	socioeconomic	realities	that	
make	 us	 feel	 like	 we	 are	 in	 a	 colossal	 paradox:	 the	 French	 territory	 increases	 in	
population	and	decreases	 in	absolute	value	 in	 terms	of	employment,	employment	 is	
literally	 attracted	 by	 Luxembourg,	 with	 all	 the	 disorders	 that	 can	 create”	 (F2)6.	Inequalities	in	this	context	are	deeply	related	to	international	fiscal	agreements,	as	summarised	in	a	recent	newspaper	interview:	“In	order	to	avoid	double	taxation,	the	
OECD's	 "Model	 Tax	 Convention	 on	 Income	 and	 Capital"	 provides	 that	 the	 country	
where	the	employment	is	carried	out	undertakes	remuneration	of	the	employee.	This	
principle	 holds	 true	 for	 a	 Frenchman	 living	 and	working	 in	 London,	 but	 not	 for	 a	
frontier	worker	who	is	dependent	on	his	country	of	residence.	With	Luxembourg,	we	
are	 dealing	 with	 a	 state	 that	 has	 focused	 its	 entire	 development	 model	 on	 fiscal	
underbidding	and	refuses	to	hear	about	balance.	Of	the	440,000	jobs	in	the	country,	
200,000	are	held	by	cross-border	workers.	While	 two	assets	 contribute	 to	 the	 state	
budget,	only	one	 is	covered	by	the	state.	Thus,	 the	more	cross-border	commuters	 in	
Luxembourg,	the	more	tax	revenue	there	is,	and	the	more	Luxembourg	can	lower	its	
tax	rates	and	increase	its	competitiveness”7.	Spatial	justice	seems	to	suit	the	specific	
 5	 See	 for	 instance	 the	 text	 in	 the	 magazine	 Diacritik:	 “Macron,	 responsabiliser,	 culpabiliser,	criminaliser	les	pauvres”.	Available	at:	https://diacritik.com/2018/06/14/macron-responsabiliser-culpabiliser-criminaliser-les-pauvres/;	accessed	3rd	September	2019.		6	 All	 the	 interviews	 for	 this	 report	were	 conducted	 in	 French	 and	 translated	 into	 English	 by	 the	authors.	7	Extract	from	newspaper	interview	conducted	with	Louis	François	Reitz,	institutional	cooperation	delegate	 at	 Metz,	 16.04.2019	 https://www.swissinfo.ch/fre/imposition-des-frontaliers-_-l-ue-a-échoué-à-créer-une-solidarité-dans-ses-régions-transfrontalières-/44882482	
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fiscal	 dimension,	 as	 the	 debate	 has	 recently	 also	 taken	 an	 ethical	 turn	 (Evrard,	2018).	 At	 first,	 interviewees	 related	 more	 to	 the	 notions	 of	 disparities	 and	inequalities.	Spatial	 justice	also	appeared	to	be	a	very	useful	notion,	especially	to	address	the	shortages	in	terms	of	access	to	public	services	(i.e.	health	care,	transport	and	 other	 common	public	 infrastructure)	 and	with	 the	 challenges	 that	 relatively	small	 municipalities	 have	 had	 to	 face	 following	 deindustrialisation,	 population	emigration	and	rather	sudden	and	steady	population	increase:	“It	is	a	territory	that	
was	 very	 active	 with	 its	 industrial	 past,	 which	 has	 been	 marked	 by	 a	 rapid	
deindustrialisation	of	wasteland,	etc.,	which	is	rather	sad;	we	are	on	a	reversal	of	the	
situation	 which	 benefits	 both	 from	 Luxembourg's	 attractiveness	 but	 which	 must	
regulate	the	effects	of	an	attractiveness	and	a	cross-border	situation	with	an	element	
of	double	standards	in	terms	of	taxation,	which	means	that	we	have	this	imbalance”	(F2).	 Even	 though	 spatial	 justice	 is	 a	 notion	 that	 interviewees	 do	 not	 mobilise	intuitively,	it	proves	useful	to	address	manifold	issues	and	situations.			
Even	 though	 the	notion	of	 spatial	 justice	 is	 rather	well	 known	 in	 academic	
discourse,	 the	 way	 spatial	 and	 social	 justice	 are	 thought	 of	 relies	 on	
disciplinary	anchorage.	As	summarised	by	Forsé	and	Galland	(2011):		“Social	justice	is	not	(…)	a	subject	with	a	tradition	of	sociological	studies	
and,	in	fact,	it	is	now	rather	related	disciplines	that	have	taken	up	much	
of	 it.	 Philosophers	 have	 multiplied	 the	 debates	 around	 justice,	
particularly	 since	 the	 publication	 of	 John	 Rawls'	 book	 in	 1971.	
Psychosociologists	have	conducted	numerous	experiments	on	this	issue	
for	several	decades.	Economists	(bibliometric	data	prove	it)	devote	an	
increasing	number	of	studies	to	this	subject,	especially	since	the	work	of	
Amartya	Sen	(1992)	has	had	global	resonance.	[One	could	add	that	the	resonance	of	Thomas	Piketty’s	book	(2014)	has	also	shed	new	light	on	these	issues,	including	in	France].	Sociologists	are	not	disarmed	on	
a	 theoretical	 level	 since,	 at	 the	 very	 moment	 their	 discipline	 was	
founded,	Durkheim	 (1893)	 for	 example	 considered	 that	 social	 justice	
was	at	the	heart	of	what	could	ensure	the	cohesion	of	a	modern	society	
(in	his	vocabulary	he	 spoke	of	 "organic"	 solidarity).	Nevertheless,	 the	
question	 of	 "social	 cohesion",	 as	 it	 is	 now	 called,	 is	 often	 still	 being	
addressed	 today	 without	 even	 raising	 the	 question	 of	 justice.	
Inequalities	are	carefully	dissected,	but	the	empirical	link	with	justice	is	
absent”8.	In	 fact,	 these	 discussions	 can	 give	 the	 impression	 of	 overlooking	 the	 spatial	dimension	 of	 social	 justice.	 This	 might	 relate	 to	 the	 important	 legacy	 of	 major	twentieth	century	thinkers	such	as	Bourdieu,	Foucault	or	Derrida.	Or	are	they	just	the	trees	that	hide	the	forest?	The	so-called	‘spatial	turn’	has	not	only	happened	in	Anglo-Saxon	 academia.	 As	 Backouche	 et	 al.	 (2016)	 recall:	 sociologists	 have	developed	 localised	 surveys	 (Esprits	 des	 lieux,	 1986;	 Chamboredon	 et	 al.,	 1984;	Bozon,	1984),	sociologists	and	historians	have	emphasised	the	need	not	to	consider	space	as	the	support	or	the	container	for	social	relations	any	longer	(Perrot,	1974).	In	fact,	to	avoid	dissociating	the	social	from	the	spatial,	they	call	for	the	spatial	to	be	thought	of	not	as	the	context	of	but	rather	as	a	constraint,	a	resource,	a	component	
 8	Translation	from	French	to	English	by	the	authors.	
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of	the	social	(Backouche	et	al.,	2016:	10).	Next	to	this	approach,	the	journal	Justice	
spatiale	/	Spatial	Justice	(JSSJ)	relies	on	“the	conviction	that	space	is	a	fundamental	
dimension	 of	 human	 societies	 and	 that	 social	 justice	 is	 embedded	 in	 space.	 The	
understanding	of	interactions	between	space	and	societies	is	essential	to	understand	
social	 injustices	 and	 to	 reflect	 on	 the	 planning	 policies	 that	 aim	 to	 reduce	 them”	(Dufaux	 et	 al.,	 2009:1).	 The	 creation	 of	 this	 scientific	 peer-reviewed	 bilingual	(French/English)	academic	journal	in	2009	illustrates	the	ambition	to	deal	first	and	foremost	with	spatial	 justice.	Open-source	and	open	to	non-academics	(i.e.	public	space	section),	it	exemplifies	the	willingness	to	better	expand	academic	thought	on	spatial	 justice	 internationally	 and	 to	 facilitate	 exchange	 between	 disciplines.	 It	refers	 largely	 to	 Harvey	 and	 Soja’s	 initial	 texts	 when	 identifying	 the	 rising	importance	given	to	social	and	then	to	spatial	 justice	in	geography	(Morange	and	Quentin,	2018).	Even	the	critical	work	of	Henry	Lefebvre	(Right	to	the	City)	had	to	be	somehow	re-legitimised	by	American	critical	urban	theory	in	the	1990s	(Kerr,	Brenner	 or	Marcuse,	 for	 instance)	 before	 coming	 back	 into	 the	 French	 academic	world	 in	 recent	 years	 (Fall,	 2007).	 Whereas	 this	 intellectual	 debate	 plays	 an	important	role	among	academics	and	scholars,	it	has	very	little	input	into	policies	and	politics.	It	can	partly	be	explained	by	the	difference	in	academic	curricula	and	traditions.	While	geography	is	traditionally	more	critical	(e.g.	mobilising	more	the	concept	of	spatial	justice),	spatial	planning	is	more	normative,	oriented	towards	the	implementation	of	the	aménagement	du	territoire	 in	all	administrations.	This	also	impacts	their	respective	relationships	with	the	science-policy	interface,	which	is	of	deep	 concern	 for	 planning	 and	 less	 of	 a	 consideration	 for	 geography.	 These	disciplines	therefore	have	a	different	approach	towards	their	own	implication	and	visibility	in	society.			
2.2 Capturing	policies	promoting	spatial	justice	in	a	national	context		
• From	 the	 “equality	 of	 territories”	 (Estèbe,	 2015)	 to	 the	 “competitive	
regulation	of	territorial	cooperation”	(Epstein,	2015)	
“What	is	specific	about	this	country	[France],	is	the	unique	interweaving	of	the	local	
and	the	central,	which	is	marked	both	by	the	presence	of	state	agents	in	the	capitals	of	
the	cantons,	and	the	presence	of	mayors	of	the	most	rural	municipalities	at	the	heart	
of	the	national	legislative	process”	(Estèbe,	2015:11).		This	 quotation	 illustrates	 well	 the	 constant	 discussion	 -	 and	 power	 struggle	 -	between	 the	 local	 and	 the	 national	 in	 the	 attempt	 to	 homogenise	 development	between	territories.	This	is	what	Estèbe	calls	“the	equality	of	territories:	a	French	
passion”	 (2015).	Here,	 policy,	 politics	 and	polities	 are	highly	 intertwined.	 In	 the	following	 paragraphs,	 we	 outline	 a	 few	 aspects	 that	 seem	 to	 be	 crucial	 for	understanding	how	France	promotes	spatial	justice.		Firstly,	Estèbe	(2015:	11-12)	recalls	three	geographical	characteristics	of	the	French	territory	that	contribute	to	shaping	a	number	of	policy	choices	and	constraints	for	policy	implementation.	In	comparison	with	other	European	countries	of	similar	size,		
1) “France	is	a	sparsely	populated	country,	but	there	are	people	living	everywhere.		
2) France	 is	 a	 country	where	 large	 cities	 are	weak,	 not	 because	 of	 the	 overwhelming	
weight	of	Paris,	but	because	of	the	weight	of	medium-sized	and	small	cities	
3) France	is	a	country	that	has	not	made	its	rural	area	disappear	politically.”		
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As	 a	 consequence,	 in	 relation	 to	1)	 it	 is	 relatively	 costly	 to	 administer	 a	 country	providing	similar	services	in	pretty	much	all	points	of	the	territory.	2)	Medium-sized	and	 small	 cities	 have,	 for	 a	 long	 time,	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 daily	 life	 for	services	of	proximity,	and	have	been	instrumental	 for	the	state	to	deploy	its	own	public	services	locally	(e.g.	prefectures,	high	schools,	courts,	chambers	of	commerce	and	industry,	health	care).	3)	In	contrast	to	other	large	European	countries,	small	municipalities	 have	 remained	 independent	 until	 very	 recently.	 The	 Senate	 is	 the	most	 iconic	 example	 of	 the	 representation	 of	 rural	 territories	 in	 the	 legislative	authority.	For	Estèbe,	the	equality	of	territories	is	a	central	question	undermining	the	 way	 space	 is	 administered.	 Republican	 equality	 means	 multiplying	 small	communities	while	integration	into	the	country	is	undertaken	via	the	grid	formed	by	small	and	medium-sized	towns.	The	principal	of	equality	is	deeply	anchored	
in	 the	 way	 territory	 is	 conceived	 and	 administered.	 For	 Estèbe,	 it	 has	 been	implemented	in	three	main	steps	over	the	years:		1) Equality	 between	 territories	 means	 equality	 in	 rights.	 In	 the	 19th	 and	 20th	centuries,	the	state	ensured	that	its	sovereign	functions	(i.e.	justice,	policing,	social	affairs,	cultural	infrastructure,	agriculture,	and	the	environment)	would	be	evenly	available	at	the	local	level	(what	now	is	LAU2).	This	is	both	a	form	of	control	over	the	territory	and	a	service	to	the	population.	Also,	a	complex	system	of	financial	
equalisation	was	set	up	in	the	1960s.	This	has	constitutional	underpinnings:	“The	
law	provides	for	financial	equalisation	schemes	to	promote	equality	between	local	and	
regional	 authorities”	 (article	 72.2).	 As	 we	 will	 show	 later,	 this	 system	 is	 key	 in	reducing	 territorial	disparities.	At	 the	 same	 time,	municipalities	benefit	 from	 the	right	 to	 free	administration	 (i.e.	 right	 to	 set	 the	 level	of	 local	 tax).	Also,	until	 the	liberalisation	 of	 the	 market	 for	 postal	 services,	 water	 supply,	 telephone,	 gas,	electricity,	 these	services	were	highly	 influenced	by	state-driven	enterprises	 that	hold	monopolies	on	the	networks	and	supply,	thus	ensuring	access	to	these	in	these	services	all	over	the	territory.	2) After	 the	 Second	 World	 War,	 equality	 between	 territories	 was	 articulated	
through	 the	 attempt	 to	 facilitate	 economic	 and	 industrial	 specialisation	 of	
territories.	This	ambition	aims	to	support	economic	expansion.	A	hierarchic	spatial	planning	scheme	defines	the	urban	structure	upon	which	functions	(e.g.	transport,	health,	education	and	innovation)	are	anchored.	In	this	strategic	spatial	vision,	the	relation	with	territories	changes;	they	are	allocated	a	function	that	is	intended	to	support	the	broader	economic,	social	and	technological	development	of	the	country.	This	strategy	is	implemented	by	an	inter-ministerial	agency,	DATAR9.	This	system	relies	 on	 several	 state	monopolies	 and	 therefore	 needed	 to	 be	 rethought	 in	 the	1980s	when	those	latter	were	progressively	open	to	the	private	market.	3) In	1980s,	decentralisation	was	initiated,	towards	départements	and	regions10.	The	latter,	like	municipalities,	benefit	from	the	“general	clause	of	competence”,	i.e.	a	right	to	act	in	the	fields	that	they	consider	to	be	of	interest	to	their	respective	perimeters	and	 objectives.	 As	 Epstein	 recalls,	 the	 law	 however	 does	 not	 organise	 how	 the	decentralised	authorities	 shall	 cooperate	 (2015:462).	 For	Estèbe,	 to	 some	extent	this	 leads	to	competition	between	levels	of	governance,	as	authorities	of	the	
 9	Délégation	à	l’aménagement	du	territoire	et	à	l’action	régionale,	created	in	1963.	It	has	long	influenced	EU	regional	policy,	not	only	way	in	the	conception	of	policy	but	also	through	its	‘egalitarian’	approach	(see	Peyrony,	2007	and	Faludi,	2004).		10	Table	4,	p.	40,	presents	an	overview	of	the	current	division	of	competencies.	
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same	 level	 aim	 to	 attract	 production	 factors	 (assets	 and	 capital)11.	 This	competition	 allows	 some	 localities	 to	 catch	 up	 in	 terms	 of	 infrastructure	 (e.g.	schools,	transport).	However,	public	spending	rises.	In	the	1990s,	territories	were	encouraged	to	outline	their	development	project	(“projet	de	territoire”)	that	needs	to	link	economic	and	social	actors	in	the	territory	before	being	agreed	with	the	state	in	 form	 of	 a	 ‘contract’	 to	 be	 implemented.	 These	 projects	 are	 thought	 to	 spread	across	 the	 territory	 in	 a	 non-conflicting	 manner,	 and	 the	 talk	 is	 therefore	 of	“cooperative	equality	of	opportunities”.	In	the	2000s,	the	equality	of	opportunities	becomes	competitive	as	territories	are	encouraged	to	answer	“calls	for	projects”	to	receive	the	state’s	financial	support,	while	a	number	of	calls	for	projects	target	the	larger	cities.	Financial	support	then	concentrates	on	the	most	strategic	areas	as	decided	by	the	state.	This	corresponds	to	globalisation	and	liberalisation,	and	to	the	way	the	EU	cohesion	policy	also	shifts	slowly	 from	programme-based	 support	 to	 local	development,	 to	 encouraging	 the	development	of	“place-based”	development	strategies	(Barca,	2009;	Evrard,	2015).	Other	 territories	benefit	 from	 financial	 equalisation	and	other	 timely	 safety	nets.	This	 more	 ‘liberal’	 turn	 is	 reflected	 in	 DATAR’s	 new	 name:	 “Inter-ministerial	delegation	 for	 territorial	planning	 and	 competitiveness”	 (“Direction	
interministérielle	à	l’aménagement	et	à	la	compétitivité	des	territoires”)	in	200512.			Following	 the	 far-reaching	 technological	 changes	 (e.g.	 internet,	 telephone,	 post),	inhabitants	 being	 more	 mobile	 (e.g.	 individual	 cars),	 changes	 in	 the	 market	regulation	(e.g.	EU	single	market	and	EU	competition	law),	French	politicians	then	called	for	the	idea	of	the	“equality	of	the	territories”	to	be	rethought.	From	the	2010s		onwards,	 for	 instance,	 the	 state	 started	 to	 support	 France’s	 biggest	métropoles,	invoking	 rising	 global	 competition,	 by	 supporting	 the	 concentration	 of	 factors	 of	production,	assets	and	wealth	at	the	expense	of	smaller	towns	and	cities.	For	Estèbe,	they	 do	 contribute	 to	 overspill	 and	 gushing	 out:	 they	 draw	 in	 workers	 and	businesses	 from	 surrounding	 areas,	 displacing	 residents,	 tourists,	 the	 retired	population,	support	functions	and	consumers	(Estèbe,	2015:	45),		while	other	pieces	of	research	underline	the	weak	redistribution	of	métropoles’	accumulation	of	wealth	to	other	territories	(see	for	instance	Davezies,	2012).	Estèbe	identifies	three	recent	changes	affecting	the	equality	of	rights	between	
territories.	In	2010,	the	state	reformed	the	way	its	devolved	services	are	operated	locally.	Civil	 servants	who	used	 to	support	rural	municipalities	with	a	number	of	services	 (e.g.	equipment,	 technical	 services)	have	been	 fully	 restructured,	 so	 that	municipalities	 have	 to	 rely	 on	 the	 department	 or	 on	 the	 private	 sector	 (Estèbe,	2015:51).	 Secondly,	 an	 institutional	 reform	 (MAPTAM	 law)	 allows	 metropolitan	areas	to	benefit	from	a	dedicated	status	and	legal	personality,	thus	creating	a	form	
of	differentiation	between	local	authorities	that	is	well	known	in	other	countries	(e.g.	 Italy,	 UK,	 Germany)	 but	was	 new	 to	 France.	 Over	 the	 years,	métropoles	 are	
 11	Governance	 is	 the	appropriate	notion,	as	 it	reflects	a	situation	where	“Government	 institutions	have	lost	the	monopoly	on	the	conduct	of	public	action,	which	is	complexly	constructed	through	the	behaviour	of	a	multiplicity	of	public	and	private	actors	structured	at	multiple	scales,	from	local	to	global”	(Epstein,	2015:	463).		12	In	2009,	the	name	changed	back	to	DATAR,	standing	for	“Interministerial	Delegation	for	Territorial	Development	and	Regional	Attractiveness”	(Délégation	à	l’aménagement	du	territoire	et	
à	l’attractivité	régionale).	In	comparison	with	its	original	name,	the	end	has	changed	from	“for	regional	action”	to	“regional	attractiveness”.		
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encouraged	 to	 gain	 and	 receive	 the	 most	 strategic	 competencies,	 leaving	 few	competencies	to	the	départements.	This	situation	has	been	reinforced	with	the	last	territorial	reform	(2015),	which	regroups	regions	(moving	from	22	to	13	regions)	and	 confirms	 their	 strategic	 competencies	 (e.g.	 economy,	 spatial	 planning,	innovation,	higher	education,	professional	 training).	Thirdly,	while	municipalities	were	used	to	regular	increases	in	state	grants	that	mostly	simply	corresponded	to	inflation,	 these	 have	 constantly	 decreased	 from	 2014	 onwards,	 showing	 a	 clear	intention	on	the	part	of	the	state	to	cut	public	expenses	at	all	levels	(Figure	1:	Level	of	the	 general	 operating	 grant	 (Dotation	 Globale	 de	 Fonctionnement)	 allocated	 yearly	 by	 the	 state	 to	 the	municipalities).		
	
Figure	1:	Level	of	the	general	operating	grant	(Dotation	Globale	de	Fonctionnement)	allocated	yearly	by	the	state	to	the	municipalities		Source:	Le	Monde,	17.07.201813		All	these	aspects	could	lead	to	the	conclusion	that	the	state	no	longer	plays	a	role	in	territorial	governance.	Recent	research	demonstrates	however	that	the	situation	is	much	 more	 complex:	 there	 is	 a	 mix	 of	 state	 withdrawal	 combined	 with	reengagement	in	managing	specific	initiatives.	This	can	be	observed	in	metropolitan	areas	in	particular,	but	also	more	broadly	for	all	territories	(Epstein,	2015:	465).	For	the	 latter,	 Epstein	 identifies	 3	 main	 forms	 of	 territorial	 governance:	 calls	 for	projects,	labels	and	awards,	and	performance	indicators.	We	shall	not	address	the	details	 of	 those	mechanisms,	 but	 these	 are	 precisely	 the	 form	 of	 support	 which	localities	under	scrutiny	in	the	case	studies	try	to	mobilise.	These	“remote	steering	instruments”	contribute	to	reshuffling	the	vertical	dimension	of	the	construction	of	collective	actions	locally	(Epstein,	2015:	476).		
 13	See:	https://www.lemonde.fr/politique/article/2017/07/17/les-reformes-qui-ont-bouleverse-les-collectivites-territoriales-en-dix-ans_5161711_823448.html	
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This	sub-section	has	allowed	us	to	better	understand	the	evolution	of	the	French	state	conception	of	development.	In	the	next	part,	we	concentrate	our	attention	on	the	effects	of	those	policies	on	territorial	disparities	in	France.				
• Assessing	the	effectiveness	of	redistributive	policies	in	France		Laurent	Davezies	(2008,	2012)	and	Magali	Talandier	(2008)	underline	the	limits	of	GDP	 in	 measuring	 territorial	 inequalities.	 Instead,	 they	 suggest	 measuring	 the	variation	of	four	types	of	incomes:	1)	income	on	production;	2)	pensions	and	welfare	benefits;	 3)	 consumption-based	 income;	 4)	 tourism.	 This	 typology	 allows	 the	identification	of	four	different	territories	in	France:		- Dynamic	 productive	 territories.	 These	 are	 the	 main	 métropoles,	 in	particular	 Paris	 and	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent	 Lyon,	 Aix-Marseille,	 Toulouse	 or	Nantes,	for	instance.	In	short,	those	territories	are	rich	because	they	produce	wealth.		- Dynamic	residential	territories,	for	which	incomes	are	more	dependent	on	tourism	and	the	residency	of	a	rich,	retired	population.	These	territories	are	mostly	the	western	and	southern	coasts.		- Declining	former	industrial	basins,	with	the	north	of	France	(declining	but	still	with	a	consumption-based	economy)	being	distinguished	from	eastern	France	(declining	and	welfare	benefits-based	economy).		Davezies	 (2008,	 2012)	 emphasises	 the	 role	 played	 by	 centralisation	 and	 the	redistributive	policies	 in	 comparison	with	other	European	 countries.	Despite	 the	complaints	expressed	 in	 the	 ‘yellow	vests’	movement,	France	 remains	one	of	 the	most	 redistributive	 systems	 in	 the	 world.	 He	 outlines	 three	 key	 redistributive	mechanisms.	Firstly,	the	mobility	of	the	population	contributes	to	spreading	the	wealth	created	in	the	metropolises	to	elsewhere.	The	state	influences	the	way	this	wealth	 is	 redistributed,	 as	 it	 defines	 a	 high	 number	 of	 school	 holidays	 (in	comparison	with	 the	 rest	of	Europe).	Yet	not	all	 categories	of	 the	population	are	mobile.	 The	 creation	 of	 jobs	 in	métropoles	 does	 not	 necessarily	 mean	 that	 the	population	in	declining	regions	(eastern	and	northern	France)	will	access	them.	On	the	 contrary,	 this	 ‘poor’	 population	 is	 not	mobile	 precisely	 because	 of	 territorial	stigmatisation,	a	lack	of	trust	(i.e.	the	perception	that	mobility	is	not	for	them,	that	they	do	not	deserve	it)	and	the	existing	solidarity	networks.		Secondly,	welfare	 benefits	 and	 pensions	 represent	 one	 of	 the	 most	 powerful	redistributive	policies.	They	are	collected	by	the	state	through	taxes	(mostly	from	the	 richest	 populations	 and	 businesses	 through	 incomes,	 businesses	 and	 added-value	taxes),	again	reflecting	the	structural	role	that	centralisation	still	has.		Thirdly,	public	 employment	 (i.e.	 employees	 in	 the	 police,	 education	 and	 health	sectors	are	national	civil	servants)	continues	to	play	an	important	role	in	rural	areas	and	small	cities	that	have	lost	most	of	their	productive	economy	(as	a	consequence	of	the	closing	down	of	small	industries)	in	the	last	2	decades	(Davezies,	2008,	2012;		Talandier,	2008).		Last	but	not	least,	as	outlined	earlier,	state	grants	continue	to	play	an	important	role	for	 all	 levels	 of	 governance	 (e.g.	 municipalities,	 départements,	 regions)	 and	contribute	to	redistribution	of	wealth.	Their	decline	represents	a	risk	for	the	most	fragile	local	authorities.		
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2.3 Framing	the	cases			The	case	studies	have	been	selected	to	respond	to	each	other.	They	are	part	of	the	category	identified	by	Davezies	and	Talandier	as	declining	former	industrial	basins.	Policymakers	have	been	managing	deindustrialisation	and	outmigration	 from	the	1970s	 to	 the	 present	 day.	 Both	 localities	 face	 the	 need	 to	 redefine	 their	
respective	 economic	 positioning.	 Former	 industrial	 basins	 are	 not	 necessarily	those	 benefiting	 from	 the	 recent,	 still	 limited,	 economic	 redevelopment	 (map).	Currently,	the	industry	plays	a	limited	role	in	the	localities’	economies.	The	question	therefore	 for	 these	 territories,	 in	 line	with	 the	RELOCAL	questions,	 is	 how	 these	territories	define	local	development	strategies.	In	addition,	important	differences	have	to	be	noticed.	On	the	one	hand,	the	Euralens	case	 study	 represents	 an	 extreme	 case	 of	 poverty,	 low	 education	 and	unemployment,	which	makes	an	area	where	several	forms	of	spatial	injustice	can	be	observed.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 EPA	Alzette-Belval	 represents	 another	 form	 of	extreme	 (inter)dependency	 towards	 the	 neighbouring	 economy	 of	 Luxembourg	(e.g.	employment,	low	economic	activity	and	extreme	differences	in	income	in	the	population).	 In	 this	 case,	 the	 state	 border	 not	 only	 marks	 disparities	 but	 also	amplifies	them,	as	one	state	system	is	designed	in	such	a	way	that	it	benefits	from	the	labour	force	from	neighbouring	regions	without	supporting	its	cost.	Annex	6.1	in	 this	 report	 provides	 comparative	 data	 on	 the	 cases.	 As	 such,	 these	 two	 cases	present	different	forms	of	spatial	injustice.		Also,	two	different	trajectories	can	be	identified.	On	the	one	hand,	the	EPA	Alzette-Belval	 and	 the	 CCPHVA	 accepted	 a	 reliance	 on	 Luxembourg’s	 economic	development.	 The	 main	 ambition	 is	 to	 structure	 spatial	 development	 in	 a	coordinated	manner,	welcoming	new	populations	of	cross-border	workers	and,	in	doing	 so,	 developing	 first	 the	 residential	 economy	 and	 shared	 cross-border	infrastructure	(e.g.	transport).	This	pathway	is	thought	of	as	a	lever	for	initiating	co-development;	it	 is	coordinated	by	a	state-led	planning	agency	(top-down).	On	the	other	hand,	the	Euralens	case	study	has	put	emphasis	on	the	Rifkin	strategy	towards	a	3rd	 industrial	 revolution,	while	 it	 has	 also	 launched	 (from	a	 social	 and	 cultural	point	of	view)	a	process	of	reconsidering	its	mining	heritage	to	better	shape	its	own	future	development.	By	contrast	to	the	EPA,	Euralens	is	a	forum	of	actors	led	by	local	politicians	(supposedly	more	bottom-up).	These	two	cases	are	therefore	also	two	different	 forms	 of	 territorial	 governance.	 They	 allow	 us	 to	 carefully	 analyse	 the	question	of	 local	autonomy	in	two	ways:	1)	the	effective	room	for	manoeuvre	for	local	 and	 regional	 public	 authorities	 to	 shape	 local	 development,	 and	 2)	 the	autonomy	of	civil	society	in	shaping	local	development.			 	
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3. The	studied	cases	in	a	comparative	perspective			
3.1 Characterising	the	cases		Table	1	outlines	the	main	characteristics	of	the	selected	case	studies.			 	 Euralens		
(Nord-Pas	de	Calais)	
EPA	Alzette-Belval	
(Lorraine)	
What	is	it?		 An	inter-scalar	forum	of	actors	led	by	local	politicians	whose	ambitions	are	self-defined	
A	state-led	planning	intervention	whose	ambitions	are	defined	by	the	ministries	in	charge,	legal	obligations	are	defined	in	law	
How	did	it	
emerge?	
Supposedly	bottom-up	(decision	by	the	Pas-de-Calais	region,	accompanying	the	Louvre-Lens	opening)	
Supposedly	top-down	(willingness	of	the	French	state	to	steer	co-development	with	Luxembourg)	
When	and	for	
how	long?	
Since	2009	and	indefinite	duration	 Since	2012	and	for	20	years	
What	does	it	aim	
at?		
1/	Metropolitan	governance	laboratory	2/	Support	to	local	development	initiatives	
1/	(Cross-border)	territorial	governance	2/	Developing	the	locality,	mainly	with	housing	
Socioeconomic	
context?	
Former	coal	mining	basin	-	the	poorest	region	of	France	today	/	benefits	very	little	from	the	proximity	to	Lille	
Former	iron	mining	and	steel	industry	region	-	severe	economic	and	demographic	decline,	but	redevelopment	driven	by	Luxembourg	recently	
Who	is	leading	
the	action?	
Association	led	by	local	politicians	in	association	with	regional	and	state	actors	and	supposedly	with	civil	society	(though	absent	from	the	decision-making).	Euralens	also	has	a	small	team	of	dedicated	employees	(4)	but	also	relies	on	local	authorities’	administrations	for	most	of	its	actions.	
State-led	agency	mandated	by	the	council	of	ministers.	Steering	is	de	facto	undertaken	by	a	board	of	directors,	linking	the	competent	ministries,	Grand-Est	region,	the	départements	of	Moselle	and	Meurthe-et-Moselle,	and	the	CCPHVA.	Considerable	room	for	manoeuvre	is	left	to	the	appointed	Director,	accountable	to	the	Board.		
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What	do	they	do	
in	practice?		
*	Incubator	for	local	development	projects.	Support	for	local	initiative	is	mainly	qualitative	(e.g.	labelling,	advice	from	external	experts)	and	in	terms	of	visibility	within	the	locality	*	Structures	territorial	governance	in	the	locality	
*	Based	on	its	strategic	planning	scheme,	it	buys	plots	of	land	(i.e.	industrial	brownfield	land	or	mining	estate)	to	either	renovate	it	or	develop	new	housing	estates	in	line	with	highest	ecological	standards	(ÉcoCité	label)	*	Structures	territorial	governance	in	the	locality		
Table	1:	Key	characteristics	of	the	selected	case	studies		From	Table	1,	one	can	gain	the	impression	that	the	EPA	Alzette-Belval	and	Euralens	have	about	the	same	maturity.	This	is	partly	the	case,	as	they	were	initiated	within	4	 years	 of	 one	 another.	 In	 fact,	 the	 nature	 of	 their	 respective	 activities	 and	 the	rationale	 for	 their	 action	 give	 more	 longevity	 to	 Euralens.	 Euralens	 has	 been	conceived	 by	 the	 Region	 Nord-Pas-de-Calais	 as	 the	 tool	 to	 help	 local	 actors	 to	connect,	to	enable	better	embedding	of	Le	Louvre	Lens	and	thus	to	stimulate	local	development.	 As	 WP7	 local	 workshop	 has	 demonstrated	 (see	 document	“Operationalising	WP7	Guidelines”),	Euralens’s	10th	anniversary	celebration	in	June	2019	was	seen,	especially	by	its	new	director,	as	an	opportunity	to	rethink	1)	the	way	Euralens	acts	as	leverage	for	local	development	in	the	region,	and	2)	its	role	within	the	broader	territorial	governance	of	the	locality.	The	EPA	Alzette-Belval,	by	contrast,	can	be	seen	as	“a	newcomer”	in	the	locality,	that	needed	first	to	establish	and	concretise	its	planning	strategy,	acquire	land	and	property	before	conducting	operations	 of	 decontamination,	 restoration,	 renovation	 and	 redevelopment.	 The	later	development	projects	started	while	fieldwork	was	being	conducted	in	2018.		More	generally,	there	are	important	differences	to	be	pointed	out	as	to	how	local	development	 unfolds	 in	 the	 localities	 under	 scrutiny.	 The	mining	 basin	 appears	more	advanced	in	supporting	local	initiatives	(at	least	at	the	institutional	level)	than	the	CCPHVA.	Our	understanding	 is	 that	 the	 interviewed	 inhabitants	 and	political	representatives	in	the	mining	basin	represent	a	quite	inward-looking	locality,	aware	of	 the	 locality’s	 own	 challenges	 and	 affected	 by	 a	 deep	 feeling	 of	 having	 been	abandoned	and	deprived	of	public	support.	The	members	of	civil	society	(as	well	as	the	private	sector)	interviewed	seem	to	rely	more	on	their	own	capacity	to	initiate	local	development.	The	mining	basin	is	also	a	politicised	locality.	A	number	of	local	initiatives	are	voluntarily	anchored	in	a	logic	of	solidarity	which	is	often	related	to	the	 leftist	 and	 unionist	 heritage	 in	 inhabitants’	 and	 politicians’	 discourses.	 The	actual	battle	between	left-wing	and	far-right	politicians	at	the	scale	of	the	locality	is	partly	based	on	who	is	better	situated	to	defend	the	(national)	solidarity	with	the	local	population,	which	is	portrayed	as	deprived.			The	governance	model	initiated	by	Euralens	is	considered	to	be	innovative	by	the	ministry	in	charge,	as	it	supposedly	represents	a	form	of	“IBA14	à	la	française”.	This	
 14	Internationale	Bauausstellungen	(German),	which	means	International	Architecture	Exhibitions.	
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assertion	is	quite	accurate,	as	Euralens’s	policy	(in	particular	through	labelling	of	local	initiatives)	is	precisely	a	reproduction	of	the	policy	developed	in	the	context	of	the	IBA	Emscher	Park	in	Germany.	As	such,	it	is	one	of	the	first	translations	of	this	policy	to	the	French	context.	Since	spring	2019,	a	ministry-led	group	of	urbanists,	architects	and	researchers	have	analysed	it	as	one	possible	model	for	a	bottom-up	organisation	capable	of	initiating	local	development.		The	supposedly	most	significant	contribution	of	such	an	IBA-like	approach	to	local	development	 is	on	procedural	 justice.	 Indeed,	 in	 the	case	of	Euralens,	non-public	actors	such	as	NGOs,	businesses	and	even	inhabitants	are	invited	to	participate	in	general	 assemblies,	 and	 can	 contribute	 through	 dedicated	 workshops	 and	deliverables	to	express	their	recommendations	in	a	particular	domain	in	which	they	appear	 as	 legitimate	 or	 simply	 willing	 to	 give	 their	 opinion.	 To	 that	 extent,	 it	represents,	 in	 the	very	 institutionalised	French	environment,	 a	quite	 remarkably	flexible	way	of	doing	local	politics	of	development.		Another	significant	contribution	of	Euralens	is	its	capacity	to	attract	international	urbanists	to	produce	reflections,	advice	and	urban	action	on	a	territory	usually	off	the	 radar.	 Yet	 it	 does	 not	 represent	 a	 rupture	 in	 terms	 of	 governance	 practices.	Decision-making	capacity	remains	in	the	hands	of	local	politicians,	mainly	old,	white,	male	civil	servants,	who	insufficiently	represent	the	diversity	of	the	needs	expressed	by	the	local	population	and,	more	problematically,	reproduce	forms	of	patriarchal	government.			For	several	years,	 the	EPA	Alzette-Belval	has	been	reflecting	on	the	possibility	of	adapting	 the	 IBA	 methodology	 to	 the	 needs	 of	 its	 locality	 (Chevallier,	 2015).	 A	preparatory	mission	coordinated	by	the	EGTC	Alzette-Belval	will	kick	off	in	winter	2019	 in	 cooperation	 with	 the	 competent	 public	 authorities	 in	 Luxembourg;	 the	ambition	 is	 to	 implement	a	“development	strategy	with	a	cross-border	operational	
dimension	that	includes	joint	projects,	particularly	architectural	and	urban	planning	
projects.	 (…)”	 (interviews,	 Euralens,	 2018).	 The	 project	 is	 therefore	 to	 use	architectural	 projects	 integrated	 in	 a	 spatial	 vision	 to	 “position	 the	Alzette-Belval	
territory	on	the	international	scene	as	a	model	of	a	European	cross-border	region,	in	
terms	of	project	management	and	in	the	field	of	shared	land	development.	(…)	Also,	
the	IBA's	prefiguration	mission	will	have	to	define	how	the	inhabitants	or	future	users	
will	be	one	of	the	decision-making	forces	for	the	future	of	this	common	ground”	(EGTC	Alzette-Belval,	2019).	The	project	anchorage	is	therefore	architecture	and	planning,	and	would	be	an	opportunity	to	mobilise	the	full	potential	of	the	EGTC	Alzette-Belval	as	a	platform	of	governance	and	expertise,	whereas	past	projects	have	been	rather	modest	due	to	limited	political	ambition.		So	 far,	 the	EPA	has	not	 targeted	dimensions	 of	 procedural	 justice.	 As	 a	 state-led	initiative,	 it	does	not	 really	 foster	 the	participation	of	 local	authorities	 (and	even	less,	that	of	non-institutional	actors)	in	the	elaboration	and	in	the	implementation	of	local	development,	limiting	itself	to	the	usual	legal	participation	policy	that	has	been	demonstrated	to	be	quite	limited	(Blondiaux	and	Fourniau,	2001;	Blondiaux,	2008).						
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3.2 Findings:	Analytical	dimensions	1-5		
Dimension	1:	Perception	of	spatial	(in)justice	within	the	locality		
	
In	the	mining	basin,	the	sense	of	injustice	is	very	strong,	a	sense	of	having	been	left	behind	by	the	French	state	and	Europe	in	the	aftermath	of	deindustrialisation	and	despite	the	contribution	made	by	the	region	to	French	economic	“grandeur”	in	twentieth-century	history.	Economic,	social	and	education	characteristics	of	the	locality	(Table	3,	p.	36)	objectify	this	feeling.	The	former	mining	basin	of	the	Pas-de-Calais	possesses	a	strong	but	double-edged	‘social	image’	in	France:	an	ancient	“hard-working”	“land	of	solidarity”	that	is	connected	to	its	“mining	mythology”,	that	turned	into	a	“racist”,	“uneducated”,	“no	jobs,	no	future”	“periphery”	(RELOCAL	interviews,	2018).	This	mostly	external	stereotype	of	the	region	has	had	an	impact	on	the	way	the	inhabitants	describe	themselves,	simultaneously	showing	their	pride	and	their	low	self-esteem.			
In	the	CCPHVA,	the	feeling	of	injustice,	especially	among	formal	stakeholders,	is	that	of	not	mastering	its	own	fate.	In	the	aftermath	of	deindustrialisation,	local	decision-makers	have	felt	helpless	to	manage	the	decline	of	the	locality	and	of	the	population.	Currently,	most	 of	 the	 decision-makers’	 agenda	 is	 set	 by	 the	 need	 to	 handle	 the	consequences	of	the	strength	of	Luxembourg’s	economy	in	localities	that	are	split	between	an	elderly	population	that	used	to	work	 in	 industry	and	a	population	of	newcomers	working	in	Luxembourg.	This	feeling	of	not	being	able	to	set	the	path	of	one’s	own	development	is	increased	in	some	localities	by	the	intense	development	of	housing	led	by	the	EPA	Alzette-Belval	(e.g.	doubling	of	the	population	in	the	next	15	years).	This	 feeling	 is	 corroborated	 for	 local	decision-makers	by	one	of	being	bypassed	or	not	being	informed	by	Luxembourg’s	state,	which	is	perceived	as	too	arrogant	to	discuss	with	small	French	municipalities.		Some	 voices	 in	 the	 locality	 criticise	 the	 current	 policy	 delivered	 by	 several	municipalities	and	the	EPA	for	not	giving	sufficient	consideration	to	the	specificities	of	 the	 local	heritage	 (e.g.	 fauna	and	 flora	 in	post-industrial	areas),	 for	wishing	 to	develop	the	locality	too	rapidly	(i.e.	 large-scale	construction	of	housing),	whereas	they	wished	more	attention	would	be	paid	to	public	transport,	soft	mobility	and	the	adaptation	of	public	services	(interviews,	RELOCAL,	2018).	There	is	a	concern	that	the	significant	rise	in	population	that	is	foreseen	would	mean	expenditure	would	be	shouldered	by	the	already	overwhelmed	municipalities.	The	participant	observation	during	the	field	work	has	demonstrated	that	another	part	of	the	population	is	either	disillusioned,	considering	that	the	choices	made	by	local	politicians	and	the	EPA	do	not	meet	their	needs,	or	they	give	the	impression	of	not	knowing	the	locality	well	enough	to	contribute,	as	they	are	newcomers	to	the	region	and	spend	a	lot	of	time	commuting	between	their	work	and	home.			
Dimension	2:	Tools	and	policies	for	development	and	cohesion			Public	politicians	were	active	in	the	mining	basin	in	the	2000s,	benefiting	from	the	fact	that	the	leader	of	the	Region	Pas-de-Calais	was	from	the	territory.	Even	today,	most	of	the	actual	development	policy	(Louvre-Lens,	Euralens)	is	the	consequence	of	decisions	 taken	during	 that	period.	Nowadays,	 the	 territory	 is	 increasingly	 the	
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focus	of	state	attention,	because	of	the	rise	in	voting	for	the	far	right,	who	argue	that	little	 has	 been	 done	 to	 tackle	 the	worrying	 economic	 and	 social	 situation	 of	 the	locality,	well	documented	in	statistics	(Table	3,	p.	336).		A	large	part	of	this	policy	has	been	for	years	oriented	towards	architecture,	culture	and	 the	 implementation	 of	 the	 Rifkin	 strategy.	 Even	 though	 the	 mining	 basin	appears	now	on	the	French	and	probably	also	the	European	map	as	a	laboratory	for	green,	cultural	and	energy	transition	(e.g.	building	thermal	isolation),	the	effects	of	this	new	positioning	for	the	population	remain	sparse.	If	actual	policy	tries	to	target	territorial	stigmatisation	at	the	external	level,	little	has	been	accomplished	so	far	to	challenge	the	negative	self-perception	of	the	region	amongst	its	own	inhabitants.					Public	policies	in	the	CCPHVA	have	been	marked	by	several	institutional	challenges:	the	need	to	cope	with	the	French	state	urge	to	group	municipalities,	the	constitution	of	 the	 EPA	 Alzette-Belval	 and	 the	 cooperation	 with	 other	 Luxembourg	municipalities	 in	 the	 framework	 of	 the	 EGTC	 Alzette-Belval.	 All	 in	 all,	 the	municipalities	 keep	 having	 divergent	 views	 on	 how	 to	 cope	 with	 functional	interdependencies	 with	 Luxembourg,	 and	 of	 how	 much	 competence	 should	 be	handed	over	to	their	association,	the	CCPHVA.	The	CCPHVA	has	tried	over	the	years	to	 receive	 as	 much	 competence	 –	 and	 therefore	 allocated	 budget	 –	 from	 the	associated	municipalities	(e.g.	transport,	childcare)	as	possible.	The	constitution	of	the	EPA	Alzette-Belval	reshuffles	the	political	agenda	for	all,	as	this	mandate	from	the	 French	 state,	 its	 competencies	 and	 financial	 capacity	 provide	 it	 with	 great	powers.	Development	 and	housing	planning	 are	high	 on	 the	 agenda.	 The	 limited	financial	and	technical	resources	of	the	municipalities,	and	to	some	extent	also	of	the	CCPHVA	itself,	represent	a	real	challenge	for	supporting	and	implementing	the	EPA’s	strategy	in	terms	of	public	services,	communicating	with	the	population	and	forecasting	the	financial	impacts	of	these	developments	for	the	locality.	As	a	result,	there	is	growing	concern	on	the	side	of	the	population	towards	the	strategy	of	the	EPA	Alzette-Belval.		Public	services	(e.g.	childcare,	health	care)	are	mostly	handled	by	the	municipalities	individually,	which	face	important	funding	problems	(see	section	3).		
Dimension	3:	Coordination	and	 implementation	of	 the	action	 in	 the	 locality	
under	consideration			Euralens	and	the	EPA	Alzette-Belval	are	institutions	that	have	emerged	in	localities	facing	substantial	structural	challenges,	especially:		- deindustrialisation	and	therefore	a	need	to	define	a	new	economic	and	social	profile	for	the	region,	and	to	coordinate	this	new	development,		- relatively	 low	 leadership	 of	 local	 decision-makers	 due	 to	 the	 historical	 pre-eminence	of	industry.		Even	though	Euralens	and	the	EPA	Alzette-Belval	differ	in	their	nature,	object	and	governance,	 they	 both	 act	 as	 leverage	 for	 local	 development.	 They	 provide	 the	locality	with	technical	expertise	and	assistance	in	project	development	and	support	the	 design	 of	 territorial	 governance.	 They	 provide	 leadership	 and	 coordination.	Either	 by	 building	 their	 own	 network	 (e.g.	 Euralens’s	 Cercle	 de	 Qualité)	 or	 by	benefiting	from	national	networks	(e.g.	network	of	ÉcoCité,	of	EPAs	in	France),	they	contribute	to	bringing	outside	expertise	and	knowledge	into	the	locality,	and	they	
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also	 capitalise	 on	 these	 networks	 to	 change	 the	 locality’s	 positioning	 and	 image	inside	and	outside	the	region	and	the	country.		In	terms	of	structures,	Euralens’s	strength	is	the	EPA	Alzette-Belval’s	weakness,	and	vice	 versa.	 As	 it	 is	 an	 association,	 Euralens	 is	 a	 low-institutionalised	 structure,	adaptive	to	policy	needs	and	to	the	evolution	of	the	territory’s	needs.	On	the	other	hand,	it	has	very	limited	financial	capacities.	It	therefore	remains	mostly	operational	on	the	procedural	side	of	spatial	justice,	and	operates	very	weakly,	if	at	all,	on	the	distributive	side.	As	a	public	institution	whose	status	is	regulated	in	planning	law,	the	 EPA	Alzette-Belval	 benefits	 from	 an	 important	 number	 of	 planning	 rights	 to	implement	its	mission.	It	is	a	planning	tool	bringing	technical	(i.e.	know-how)	and	administrative	 expertise,	 financial	 means	 and	 the	 capacity	 to	 attract	 private	investment.	 It	also	benefits	 from	the	support	of	 several	ministries	and	has	direct	access	to	any	other	French	public	institution.	It	is	part	of	several	networks	that	allow	cross-fertilisation	of	ideas	and	experience.	In	fact,	in	French	planning	law,	it	is	the	strongest	institution,	as	it	holds	the	sole	competency	for	planning	over	a	designated	perimeter.	However,	it	is	less	flexible	than	Euralens.	It	is	well	equipped	to	undertake	spatial	 planning,	 yet	 it	 requires	 a	 strong	 partnership	 with	 the	 municipalities	 to	ensure	this	development	is	integrated	into	existing	settlements	(e.g.	connection	to	and	with	existing	infrastructure).	This	exemplifies	the	paradoxical	weakness	of	the	structure.	 In	 addition,	 the	 EPA	 Alzette-Belval	 relies	 on	 an	 association	 of	municipalities	 and	 on	 municipalities	 that	 are	 particularly	 weak,	 financially	 and	politically,	due	to	their	size	and	history.	It	relies	on	them	not	only	to	implement	its	strategy	in	practice,	but	also	to	liaise	with	and	involve	the	population.	To	address	this	main	governance	challenge,	the	EPA	uses	its	own	capacities	to	not	only	act	as	planner	but	also	 to	 structure	 local	development,	 in	particular	with	authorities	 in	Luxembourg.		Despite	these	differences,	Euralens	and	the	EPA	Alzette-Belval	share	the	fact	that	the	 localities	 (meaning	 the	 municipalities	 among	 them,	 but	 also	 regional,	departmental	 or	 agglomeration	 institutions	 towards	 one	 another)	 	 of	 the	 two	structures	 think	 of	 their	 relation	 to	 one	 another	 as	 competition	 rather	 than	cooperation.	The	multiplication	of	low-funded	labels	(led	by	institutions	in	all	parts	of	the	Euralens	association)	to	support	local	development	is	only	one	example	in	the	mining	 basin,	while	 the	 decision	 to	 open	 a	 quarry	 in	Audun-le-Tiche	despite	 the	protests	 of	 neighbouring	 municipalities	 and	 citizens’	 groups	 is	 an	 example	 in	CCPHVA.		In	this	context	and	against	the	backdrop	of	section	2.2,	the	French	state	appears	to	act	 differently	 in	 the	 case	 of	 CCPHVA.	 As	 mentioned	 before,	 the	 context	 and	challenges	of	 the	 localities	are	 rather	different,	 yet	 these	 localities’	pathways	are	similar.	On	the	other	hand,	 the	French	state	 is	 initiating	an	Operation	of	National	Interest	and	is	creating	the	highest	possible	planning	instrument	in	France	to	face	the	competitive	economy	of	a	neighbouring	state.		
	
Dimension	4:	Autonomy,	participation	and	engagement			Euralens	and	the	EPA	Alzette-Belval	have	established	themselves	as	cornerstones	among	 the	 public	 authorities	 in	 their	 respective	 localities.	 Yet	 they	 have	 not	managed	 to	 build	 equitable	 decision-making	 processes	with	 citizens	 and	 both	 of	them	remain	quite	unknown	amongst	the	local	population.		
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The	EPA	Alzette-Belval	for	instance	implements	the	consultation	processes	as	they	are	set	in	planning	regulations	(e.g.	public	meetings	prior	to	concretising	planning	projects).	It	also	goes	beyond	what	the	law	requires,	with	hands-on	initiatives	(e.g.	landscape	studies	and	walks	with	inhabitants).	The	way	consultation	is	undertaken	demonstrates	that	the	project	is	rather	developed	for	the	municipalities	and	possibly	also	for	the	(future)	inhabitants	than	developed	with	the	municipalities	and	its	actual	inhabitants.	It	is	even	more	challenging	that	the	earliest	development	phases	of	the	strategy	 –	 recommendations	 outlined	 by	 the	 prefiguration	 mission	 –	 have	 been	barely	 discussed	 publicly	 with	 the	 inhabitants.	 The	 way	 such	 major	 planning	projects	are	designed	and	implemented	does	not	provide	citizens	with	a	dedicated	role	and	voice.	As	a	consequence,	even	if	the	EPA	Alzette-Belval	wanted	to	set	up	a	system	providing	citizens	with	equitable	access	to	the	decision-making	process,	this	would	 probably	 go	 beyond	 the	 EPA’s	 own	 structure	 and	 capabilities.	 As	 the	municipalities	involved	are	rather	small,	having	only	few	municipal	employees	to	manage	everything,	they	are	challenged	in	building	effective	participation	processes	with	the	inhabitants	affected	by	their	development	policy.	In	fact,	as	a	tool	that	was	conceived	for	major	development	projects,	either	to	build	up	new	cities	(e.g.	Marne-La-Vallée)	or	to	build	up	new	neighbourhoods	(e.g.	La	Défense),	the	EPA	structure	appears	 both	 oversized	 and	 ill-equipped	 to	 liaise	 with	 the	 local	 population	 and	Luxembourg.		Despite	 the	 fact	 that	 Euralens	 emerged	 as	 a	 regional	 initiative,	 it	 also	 faces	challenges	in	building	transparent	and	equitable	decision-making	processes.	During	the	last	decade,	at	the	national,	European	and	regional	elections,	the	FN	(National	Front)	 was	 the	 leading	 political	 party	 in	 terms	 of	 votes	 cast	 in	 the	 locality.	Nevertheless,	because	local	elections	are	still	to	come	next	year,	the	territory	is	still	mostly	in	the	hands	of	the	left-wing	parties.	What	appears	surprising	for	several	of	the	inhabitants	and	members	of	civil	society	interviewed	is	that,	despite	this	strong	discontent	shown	to	leftist	politics,	the	left-wing	politicians	actually	in	charge	at	the	local	level	do	not	try	to	reopen	the	dialogue	with	the	local	population	by	listening	to	them	or	by	integrating	them	into	the	making	of	public	policy.	They	seem	still	trapped	in	an	old-fashioned	conception	of	politics,	that	they	embody	the	population	and	they	know	better	what	is	good	for	them	(Euralens	RELOCAL	report,	2019).	On	this,	they	are	not	very	much	challenged	by	local	administration,	who	mostly	seem	to	have	a	similar	idea	of	their	own	role	for	the	locality	(ibid.).		In	relation	to	that,	what	is	also	problematic	is	that	the	Euralens	association	does	not	pay	 attention	 to	 women	 and	 minority	 representations	 in	 local	 institutions.	 The	consequence	of	that	is	that	very	little	attention	and	very	little	credit	are	given	to	the	part	of	the	populations	that	does	not	consist	of	white	males,	nor	to	the	lower	classes.	The	 latter	 are	 still	 governed	 as	 an	 object	 of	 development	 policy	 rather	 than	 a	possible	 subject	 that	 would	 be	 legitimate	 agents	 to	 reflect	 upon,	 build	 and	implement	public	policy	on	development.				Euralens	 and	 the	 EPA	Alzette-Belval	 are	 two	major	 structures	 acting	de	 facto	 as	leverage	 for	 local	 development	 in	 their	 respective	 localities.	 Yet	 they	make	 little	effort	to	raise	the	interest	of	the	population	and	to	integrate	it	 into	public	policy-making.	This	is	partly	a	consequence	of	their	own	policies,	but	more	broadly	of	the	policy	in	general,	that	views	public	participation	as	a	problem	(or	a	legal	obligation)	rather	than	as	a	solution	for	project	building,	implementation	and	–	in	the	long	run	
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–	ownership	of	the	project	as	a	whole.	This	relates	largely	to	the	fact	that	there	is	currently	a	lack	of	consideration	of	place	knowledge	and	local	democracy	in	local	development	policies.			
Dimension	 5:	 Expression	 and	 mobilisation	 of	 place-based	 knowledge	 and	
adaptability			The	 EPA	 Alzette-Belval	 and	 Euralens	 leave	 inhabitants	 with	 mixed	 feelings.	 For	instance,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 EPA	 Alzette-Belval,	 the	 newest	 inhabitants	 tend	 to	interpret	 the	 strategy	 as	 adequately	 fitting	 the	 locality’s	 needs,	 whilst	 the	inhabitants	whose	properties	are	affected	are	rather	opposed	to	it.	Inhabitants	who	have	lived	in	the	locality	most	of	their	lives	express	their	disappointment,	remarking	how	the	project	seems	“disconnected	from	the	ground”,	conceived	“in	an	abstract	manner”,	or	 that	participation	processes	are	not	effective	as	projects	are	already	designed	 and	 decided.	 All	 in	 all,	 the	 field	 work	 demonstrates	 that	 methods	 and	processes	 for	 documenting,	 analysing	 and	 building	 on	 place	 knowledge	 are	currently	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 local	 public	 development	 policies.	 By	 place	knowledge,	we	mean	an	experience-based	understanding	of	 the	 locality	by	 living	there,	 knowing	 the	 environment,	 having	 an	 intimate,	 personal	 relation	 with	 a	locality,	all	that	drives	and	animates	feelings	of	attachment	and	a	sense	of	belonging	to	a	place.	This	form	of	knowledge	receives	 less	consideration	than	technical	and	scientific	 knowledge;	 methods	 of	 mobilising	 it	 are	 not	 part	 of	 formal	 planning	procedures.	As	such,	therefore,	this	form	of	knowledge	is	very	marginally	mobilised	by	the	EPA	Alzette-Belval.		Yet	in	the	case	of	Euralens,	some	initiatives	developed	by	local	associations	point	the	way	towards	greater	inclusion	of	the	local	population.	They	usually	direct	their	work	towards	the	immediate	neighbours	of	the	building	in	which	they	have	set	up	their	activity.	The	choice	of	their	 location	is	anything	but	a	coincidence.	What	we	witnessed	there	is	that	those	four	associations	observed	have	managed	to	create	a	dialogue	with	 some	 highly	marginalised	 inhabitants,	 through	 a	wide	 but	 regular	range	of	 activities.	During	our	 successive	periods	 of	 residence,	we	often	met	 the	same	 group	 of	 inhabitants,	 composed	 essentially	 of	 unemployed	 middle-aged	women.	 Undeniably,	 those	 people	 belong	 to	 groups	 that	 are	 at	 the	 centre	 of	 the	development	policies.	And	undeniably,	only	a	small	proportion	of	the	neighbouring	inhabitants	regularly	come	to	the	activities	organised	for	them.	Larger	groups	come	for	more	exceptional	and	larger	events.		Nevertheless,	all	four	initiatives	seem	to	us	to	be	of	great	significance	in	a	locality	such	as	that	of	Euralens.	The	comments	of	social	and	cultural	workers	(N2b,	P3,	P4,	P6,	P7,	2018),	whether	or	not	they	are	associated	directly	with	those	events,	are	that	the	breaking	of	isolation	is	the	first	and	probably	the	most	difficult	step	towards	a	reconnection	 to	 active	 life:	 “What	we	hope	 is	 that	 they	will	 regain	 trust;	 trust	 in	themselves	because	they	know	things,	they	are	able	to	do	things…	but	also	trust	in	their	neighbours.	Because	this	is	the	absence	of	trust,	the	fear	cultivated	by	TV	that	makes	the	National	Front	so	strong	here.”	(N2c,	2008).						
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3.3 Findings:	Synthesising	dimensions	A-C		
Synthesising	dimension	A:	Assessment	of	promoters	and	inhibitors			All	in	all,	the	EPA	Alzette-Belval	acts	more	on	the	distributive	side,	while	Euralens	acts	rather	on	the	procedural	side	of	spatial	justice.	Their	respective	objectives	and	governance	 settings	 are	 very	 different.	 Yet	 while	 pursuing	 their	 respective	objectives,	 their	 actions	 tend	 to	 raise	 similar	 issues	 (e.g.	 transparency,	accountability,	participation,	territorial	governance).					 	
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Promoters	 Inhibitors		The	EPA	Alzette-Belval	and	Euralens	act	as	leverage	tools	for	local	development	and	greater	spatial	justice.		
Development	is	often	conceived	and	applied	in	the	locality	instead	of	being	conceived	and	implemented	with	and	
for	the	locality.	Accountability	and	transparency	are	underestimated	in	the	actions	under	scrutiny.	Attention	(of	public	policies	and	research)	is	often	focused	on	the	outcome,	while	the	process	itself	may	(re)produce	injustices.	The	EPA	Alzette-Belval	(through	the	OIN)	and	Euralens	(through	ERBM)	exemplify	the	continuous	attempt	by	the	French	state	to	rethink	how	it	should	support	local	development.	It	tries	to	find	a	middle	way	between	decentralisation	(autonomy)	and	the	need	to	support	localities	facing	genuine	development	challenges.	These	initiatives	support	distributive	and	procedural	justice	in	principle.	
This	policy	is	not	applied	coherently	and	consistently	over	the	territory.	This	confers	an	impression	of	scattered	policy	that	contrasts	with	the	traditional	egalitarian	approach	supported	in	France,	and	which	beneficiaries	are	challenged	to	understand.		
The	EPA	Alzette-Belval	and	Euralens	have	established	themselves	as	strong	formal	stakeholders	that	contribute	to	structuring	territorial	governance.		In	doing	so,	they	provide	greater	outward	visibility	to	both	localities,	which	contributes	to	increasing	their	attractiveness.		
The	EPA	Alzette-Belval’s	and	Euralens’s	contribution	to	the	locality	does	not	sufficiently	involve	the	local	population.	Decision-making	processes	are	unclear	to	those	not	part	of	the	EPA	Alzette-Belval	and	Euralens	and	for	the	inhabitants.	Participation	in	and	accountability	for	the	decisions	taken	are	not	effective.	In	general,	integrating	the	perspective	of	the	beneficiaries	is	not	a	priority	to	them.		
Table	2:	Assessment	of	promoters	and	inhibitors	
	
Synthesising	dimension	B:	Competences	and	capacities	of	stakeholders			Despite	their	differences,	all	in	all,	the	EPA	Alzette-Belval	and	Euralens	face	similar	challenges	 in	 terms	 of	 participation,	 accountability	 and	 transparency.	 These	 are	summarised	in	the	graph	below,	which	was	prepared	for	Euralens.	It	appears	just	as	relevant	for	the	EPA	Alzette-Belval.	One	important	difference	is	to	be	noted	though:	“external	advisors”	in	the	EPA	Alzette-Belval	case	study	are	external	advisors	with	technical	expertise	(i.e.	commissioned	to	conduct	specific	planning	projects).			
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Figure	2:	Euralens,	an	incomplete	justice-maker?	Source:	Cyril	Blondel,	2019			In	addition,	the	empirical	research	has	demonstrated	the	importance	of	individuals	whose	individual	vision	contributes	to	influencing	the	locality’s	strategic	vision,	the	course	of	a	policy,	an	action	or	a	local	initiative.			
Synthesising	 dimension	 C:	 Connecting	 the	 action	 to	 procedural	 and	
distributive	justice			The	 EPA	Alzette-Belval	 and	 Euralens	make	 substantial	 contributions	 in	 terms	 of	spatial	justice	within	their	respective	localities.	The	main	contribution	of	the	EPA	is	on	 the	 side	 of	 planning	 in	 a	 coordinated	 manner,	 considerate	 of	 sustainable	development,	limited	use	of	agricultural	land,	thus	avoiding	scattered	urbanism	and	sprawl.	 Euralens	 has	 developed	 a	 local	 development	 policy	 and	 territorial	governance	which	 not	 only	 facilitated	 the	 emergence	 of	 local	 initiatives	 but	 also	contributed	to	changing	the	image	of	the	region,	both	internally	and	outwardly.		
	
Achievements	over	time	and	place		With	 their	 respective	 actions,	 the	 EPA	 Alzette-Belval	 and	 Euralens	 provide	 the	locality	 with	 leverage	 tools	 (e.g.	 organisational	 and	 technical	 knowledge,	 know-how)	to	better	structure	its	own	development.	They	act	as	tools	for	empowerment,	helping	the	localities	to	define	new	opportunities	for	their	own	local	development.	
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In	 doing	 so,	 they	 ought	 to	 contribute	 to	 changing	 the	 locality’s	 own	 image,	 both	internally	and	outwardly.		The	EPA	Alzette-Belval	does	so	primarily	as	it	is	an	agency	equipped	with	financial	and	legal	means,	as	well	as	with	technical	knowledge,	which	are	at	the	service	of	the	locality.	 Euralens	 does	 so	 as	 it	 has	 established	 hands-on	 support	 for	 local	development	initiatives.		Yet	both	fall	short	of	achieving	greater	results	in	fighting	spatial	injustices.	On	the	one	hand,	OINs	and	EPAs	are	structures	whose	effectiveness	depends	largely	on	the	municipalities	where	the	activities	are	implemented.	The	EPA	Alzette-Belval	works	on	a	rather	small	perimeter	(i.e.	8	small	peri-urban	and	rural	municipalities	that	are	politically	 divided	 on	 the	 strategic	 goals	 of	 the	 locality).	 In	 addition,	 due	 to	 the	structural	 imbalances	with	Luxembourg,	 their	 financial	situation	 is	 insecure,	 thus	calling	 into	 question	 their	 long-term	 capacity	 to	 sustain	 the	maintenance	 of	 the	installations	 planned	 by	 the	 EPA	Alzette-Belval.	 In	 addition,	 their	 capacities	 (e.g.	technical,	 know-how,	 administrative)	 are	 insufficient	 compared	 to	 the	 level	 of	ambition	raised	by	the	EPA	Alzette-Belval.	As	a	consequence,	it	is	difficult	for	these	municipalities	to	adequately	support	its	action,	and	therefore	to	effectively	tackle	spatial	 injustice	 as	 it	 could	 have	 if	 the	 municipalities	 had	 adequate	 financial	resources	and	technical	know-how.		Euralens,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 has	 established	 a	 local	 development	 policy	 that	effectively	supports	local	initiatives.	Yet	the	existence	of	competing	structures	and	policies	tend	to	blur	the	picture	for	project	leaders.	More	importantly,	even	though	it	 might	 contribute	 to	 changing	 the	 locality’s	 image	 outside	 the	 region,	 lack	 of	transparency	and	accountability	in	decision-making	processes	impede	its	capacity	to	build	fairer	procedural	justice.			
Evaluation	of	the	impact	on	the	locality			The	positive	impact	of	both	actions	should	not	be	underestimated,	even	though	it	needs	to	be	differentiated.		In	the	EPA	Alzette-Belval	case,	the	impact	is	that	of	structuring	local	planning	in	a	coordinated	manner	and	creating	new	room	for	manoeuvre	for	the	locality,	which	would	otherwise	probably	have	faced	unstructured	planning.	As	the	effectiveness	of	the	action	is,	however,	dependent	on	the	effective	capacity	of	the	CCPHVA	and	the	associated	municipalities	to	support	it,	it	makes	the	question	of	a	reform	of	taxation	of	cross-border	workers	(i.e.	tax	return	to	the	localities	hosting	a	large	proportion	of	 commuters)	 even	 more	 prominent	 for	 the	 French	 state.	 The	 number	 of	municipalities	concerned	is	greater	than	that	of	the	members	of	the	CCPHVA.	This	question	therefore	goes	beyond	merely	the	interests	of	the	locality.	It	is	a	broader	geopolitical/local	development	question,	addressing	more	broadly	the	inequitable	dynamism	 that	 can	 unfold	 in	 a	 border	 area.	 This	 situation	 also	 illustrates	 how	governance	 levels	can	be	dependent	on	one	another	when	attempting	 to	address	spatial	injustice	adequately.		In	 the	 Euralens	 case,	 one	 of	 the	main	 suggestions	 of	 our	 fieldwork	would	 be	 to	reverse	 the	 logic	 behind	 the	 local	 development	 policy,	 to	 base	 it	 less	 on	 the	institutions’	 short-term	 political	 gains	 (probably	 illusory)	 and	 more	 on	 the	experiences	of	the	local	initiative	holders.	The	long-term	objective	is	what	we	can	assume	 to	 be	 the	 common	 goal	 of	 both	 the	 institutions	 and	 the	 local	 initiative	
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holders:	to	allow	the	latter	to	develop	an	economically	viable	and,	as	importantly,	a	socially	and	environmentally	sustainable	project	that	contributes	to	the	territory’s	transition.	This	starting	point	would	then	probably	lead	to	a	complete	rethink	not	so	much	of	each	policy	and	the	goals,	but	certainly	of	their	coordination,	their	focus	and	their	efficiency.		 	
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4. Conclusions			In	the	RELOCAL	project,	two	case	studies	were	selected	in	France,	both	in	peri-urban	post-industrial	 contexts	 in	need	of	 reopening	 the	path	 to	 local	development.	The	actions	under	consideration	have	been	deliberately	chosen	as	almost	opposite	cases	(i.e.	top-down	initiative	developed	through	on-site	technical	implementation	–	EPA	Alzette-Belval	 –	 versus	 bottom-up,	 autonomous	 association	 –	 Euralens).	 Spatial	injustices	 existed	 in	 both	 localities.	 Although	 a	 number	 of	 differences	 have	 been	noted	 (e.g.	 temporal,	 spatial	 injustice	 fostered	 by	 national	 border),	 a	 number	 of	similarities	have	been	observed	in	the	cases	(e.g.	access	to	and	financing	of	public	services,	fair	and	equitable	access	to	decision-making	processes).	In	France,	spatial	injustice	was	usually	described	as	disadvantages	related	to	place	that	resulted	in	the	feeling	that	the	 local	population	had	been	 left	out,	or	that	they	were	 incapable	of	shaping	the	locality’s	own	future.		This	national	report	has	been	written	to	reflect	on	the	impact	of	successive	waves	of	decentralisation	 and	 the	 recent	 launch	 of	 nationally	 led	 thematic	 initiatives	 to	support	local	development.	We	found	that	there	are	complex	interactions	of	policies	at	 different	 scales	 as	 well	 as	 multiple	 layers	 of	 governance.	 Despite	 the	 unitary	character	of	France,	the	rationale	for	applying	one	policy	rather	than	another	can	be	more	circumstantial	than	rational,	thus	emphasising	the	driving	role	of	individuals	and	 of	 strategic	 visions	 for	 a	 territory.	 In	 this	 section,	 we	 attempt	 to	 draw	 out	synthetic	conclusions.		
	
What	 is	 being	 achieved	 in	 terms	of	 delivering	 greater	 spatial	 justice	 to	 the	
respective	localities?		
	Euralens	 and	 the	 EPA	 Alzette-Belval	 act	 as	 instruments	 of	 leverage	 in	 their	respective	localities.	Euralens	stimulates	and	empowers	local	 initiatives.	The	EPA	Alzette-Belval	 coordinates	 the	development	of	planning	and,	as	 such,	 it	will	offer	new	opportunities	for	the	economic	development	of	the	locality	and	more	facilities	for	the	current	and	future	inhabitants.	They	also	contribute	directly	to	structuring	territorial	governance	in	localities	that	otherwise	might	have	acted	in	a	dispersed	manner.	They	therefore	both	make	a	direct	contribution	to	greater	spatial	justice.	The	EPA	Alzette-Belval	targets	specifically	distributive	justice,	while	Euralens	rather	targets	procedural	justice.		These	 two	 actions	 demonstrate	 that	 despite	 decentralisation,	 the	 state	 remains	crucial	in	France:	in	the	case	of	EPA,	when	it	comes	to	stimulating	local	development	in	a	small	locality,	and	in	the	case	of	Euralens,	to	support	and	follow	local	initiative	as	 the	 state	 is	 repeatedly	 taken	 to	 ask.	 These	 cases	 demonstrate	 the	 use	 of	 two	policies	–	 culture	and	 then	planning	 (i.e.	Le	Louvre	Lens)	and	planning	and	 then	culture	(i.e.	EPA	Alzette-Belval)	–	to	empower	localities		labelled	as	“lagging	behind”.	In	 a	 traditionally	 state-centralised	 country,	 this	move	 towards	 the	 local	 is	 a	 real	change	in	the	practice	of	public	policy.		However,	Euralens	and	EPA	illustrate	quite	opposite	results	in	terms	of	achieving	greater	justice.	While	Euralens’s	action	is	a	step	towards	procedural	justice	that	is	insufficiently	founded	to	make	the	difference	in	terms	of	distributive	justice,	the	EPA	case	is	a	clear,	strong	action	towards	the	redistribution	of	wealth	and	opportunities	to	 a	 small,	 post-industrial	 locality	 trying	 to	 benefit	 from	
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proximity	to	Luxembourg.	However,	results	in	terms	of	procedural	justice	are	still	limited,	as	 the	 local	actors	 (namely	 institutions,	 inhabitants	and	civil	 society)	are	given	very	little	space	to	shape	the	development	plan	of	the	locality.		In	both	cases,	participation	remains	more	a	rhetorical	gimmick	than	a	real	objective	for	changing	how	public	policy	is	made,	whereas	in	a	time	when	the	traditional	way	of	 doing	 politics	 is	 called	 into	 question,	 such	 a	 renewal	 in	 the	 “social	 contract”	appears	very	necessary	to	regain	the	population’s	trust	in	public	policy-making.			
	
What	are	the	policy	changes	ahead	that	would	achieve	greater	impact?		
	
In	 the	mining	basin,	 there	 is	 a	need	 to	 rethink	 the	different	policies	 in	place	 to	support	 local	 initiatives	 so	 that	 they	 are	 in	 line	 with	 the	 long-term	 strategic	development	 strategy	of	 the	 region.	Establishing	a	 “guichet	unique”	 system	could	facilitate	access	to	information	and	procedures	of	project	carriers.	Also,	integrating	representatives	of	civil	society	and	citizens	 in	the	decision-making	processes	and	ensuring	 that	 transparency	 and	 accountability	 are	 integrated	 would	 facilitate	greater	trust	in	local	development	policies.		
In	 the	 EPA	 Alzette-Belval,	 the	 action	 would	 have	 greater	 effectiveness	 if	 the	municipalities	 and	 the	 CCPHVA	 were	 to	 receive	 greater	 technical	 and	 financial	support	 to	 accompany	 the	 EPA	 activities,	 and	 in	 the	 long	 run	 support	 the	management	 of	 the	 new	 facilities	 in	 place.	 More	 broadly,	 this	 involves	 stronger	positioning	 of	 France	 in	 respect	 to	 a	 return	 of	 tax	 revenue	 to	 the	municipalities	affected	by	having	a	high	proportion	of	commuters.	As	for	the	mining	basin,	the	EPA	Alzette-Belval	 action	 would	 meet	 with	 greater	 acceptance	 if	 decision-making	processes	were	more	inclusive	(i.e.	municipalities	and	civil	society)	and	made	more	transparent	to	the	public	as	a	whole.		In	 both	 cases,	 place	 knowledge	 remains	 ignored,	 despite	 its	 importance	 for	developing	 projects	 that	 suit	 the	 locality’s	 needs	 and	 specificities,	 thus	 building	ownership	by	the	public.		
	
Implications	for	national	policies	
	These	 two	 actions	 demonstrate	 that	 despite	 decentralisation,	 the	 state	 remains	crucial	in	France.	This	analysis	demonstrates	that	–	like	the	place-based	approach	promoted	 at	 the	 EU	 level	 –	 France	 encourages	 localities	 to	 develop	 their	 own	initiatives	 to	 foster	 local	 development,	 while	 the	 state	 provides	 timely	 support	through	dedicated	schemes	(e.g.	ERBM,	ÉcoCité,	EPA	à	la	française).	In	this	context,	the	 analysis	 demonstrates	 that	 regions	 facing	 steep	 challenges	 (e.g.	 economic	regeneration	 following	the	 fall	of	single	 industries,	asymmetric	border	exchanges	and	 interdependencies)	 are	 overwhelmed.	 Even	 when	 the	 state	 develops	 a	dedicated	instrument	with	dedicated	financial	means	(i.e.	EPA	Alzette-Belval),	they	are	 ill-equipped	 (e.g.	 financially,	 technical	 expertise,	 know-how,	 capabilities)	 to	effectively	 mobilise	 these	 tools	 and	 initiate	 local	 development	 on	 their	 own.	Therefore,	even	in	such	cases,	nationally	led	instruments	need	to	be	adapted	to	local	geographic,	 political	 and	 social	 specificities	 to	 be	 capable	 of	 deploying	 their	 full	impact.		
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Bottom-up	or	 top-down	 approaches	 should	not	 be	 thought	 as	 such.	 They	 should	rather	 be	 mobilised	 for	 a	 locality,	 depending	 on	 its	 needs.	 It	 therefore	 seems	important	 –	 especially	 in	 a	 unitary	 country	 like	 France	 –	 to	 1)	 keep	monitoring	spatial	disparities	and	social	inequalities	(e.g.	Observatoire	des	territoires);	2)	have	dedicated	channels	for	territories	to	bring	forward	their	respective	problems	(e.g.	
préfet);	and	as	a	consequence	of	all	this,	to	3)	keep	redistributive	measures	that	can	be	mobilised	 to	 address	 the	 deepest	 territorial	 divides.	 And	 overall,	 this	 form	of	redistributive	 justice	 cannot	 be	 considered	 in	 isolation	 from	 procedural	 justice.	There	is	a	great	need	to	theorise	and	develop	methodologies	capable	of	capturing	place	knowledge	in	order	to	build	decision-making	processes	that	not	only	involve	citizens	 and	 civil	 society	 but	 also	 build	 upon	 it.	 This	 form	 of	 knowledge	 can	 be	mobilised	in	complementarity	with	to	other	forms	of	knowledge	(e.g.	technical	and	scientific	 knowledge)	 as	 drivers	 of	 local	 development.	 In	 short,	 it	 is	 a	matter	 of	developing	 the	 process	 and	 procedures	 that	 allow	 the	 development	 of	 place-
sensitive	projects.	This	seems	crucial	 to	us	 to	develop	projects	appropriate	 to	 the	place	 specificities	 and	 needs,	 so	 that	 once	 realised,	 projects	 fit	 the	 locality.	Ultimately,	it	is	a	matter	of	building	ownership	of	the	projects.			
Relationship	with	and	implications	for	EU	policies	on	territorial	cohesion		Too	 often,	 potential	 beneficiaries	 of	 EU	 funding	 do	 not	 apply	 because	 of	 the	administrative	burden,	lack	of	knowledge	of	the	conditions,	or	simply	because	they	do	not	have	a	project	officer	dedicated	to	such	tasks.	A	lot	of	funding	benefits	those	who	have	already	had	experience	of	it.	Access	to	EU	regional	policy	should	be	more	open,	 simpler	 and	 based	more	 on	 impact	 (including	 qualitative	 and	 quantitative	indicators).		A	simple	way	to	do	so	can	be	to	open	European	satellites	with	dedicated	agents	in	territories	facing	structural	challenges	(e.g.	less	developed	and	transitional	regions).	In	 doing	 so,	 the	 objective	 would	 be	 to	 give	 “Brussels”	 a	 more	 human	 and	 less	bureaucratic	 face	 and	 1)	 to	 benefit	 from	 direct	 feedback	 on	 the	 territorial	development	 strategies	 as	 it	 is	 developed	 by	 policy-makers	 (operational	programme).	This	would	be	a	way	to	operationalise	the	place-based	approach	more	concretely.	 2)	 This	 would	 also	 provide	 any	 potential	 beneficiary	 with	 direct	feedback	 on	 project	 ideas.	 All	 in	 all,	 this	 could	 ultimately	 improve	 the	 quality	 of	projects	and	programmes	that	have	been	submitted.		Finally,	 this	 European	 antenna	 could	 integrate	 a	 form	 of	 guichet	 unique	 that	coordinates	the	policies	supporting	local	development	in	a	specific	locality.		
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6. Annexes		
6.1 List	of	indicators		The	list	of	indicators	below	is	identical	to	the	one	provided	by	NORDREGIO	for	the	data	availability	on	NUTS	2	and	NUTS	3	level	(see	also	D	2.1)	and	helps	us	to	contextualise	the	case	study	both	within	the	country	and	across	countries.	As	most	cases	will	be	below	NUTS	2	and	also	below	NUTS	3	level,	we	ask	all	partners	to	provide	the	information	below	at	the	spatial	level	of	the	particular	case.	If	the	case	does	not	match	an	administrative	or	statistical	entity,	please	provide	the	most	fine-grained	data	that	you	can	get	(e.g.	LAU-1,	LAU-2	or	a	national	classification	which	then	needs	to	be	explained).			
Indicators	that	should	be	provided	in	the	national	case	study	reports15	
	
Indicator	1_1	 		 Pôle	métropolitain	Artois	 CCPHVA		
Name	 Income	of	households	(median	standard	of	living)	 CA	Lens-Liévin:	16,656		CA	Hénin	Carvin:	16,979	CA	de	Béthune-Bruay,	Artois-Lys	Romane:	17,991	
21,680	
Indicator	4	 		 		 		
Name	 Economic	activity	rates	 68.6%	 72.4%	
Indicator	5	 		 		 		
Name	 Employment	rates	 55.3%	 62.6%	
Indicator	6	 		 		 		
Name	 Unemployment	rates	 19.3%	 13.6%	
Indicator	7	 		 		 		
Name	 Youth	unemployment	rates	 41.7%	 26.5%	
Indicator	8	 		 		 		
 15	The	precise	definitions	of	all	indicators	can	be	found	in	RELOCAL	D	2.1.	(including	year)	
 
 
 33 
   
   
Name	 Long-term	unemployment	rates	 NA	 NA	
Indicator	
10_1	
		 		 		
Name	 Life	expectancy	 Département	Pas-de-Calais:	75.8	(men)	83.2(women)		 Département	Moselle	78.3	(men)	83.7	(women)			Département	Meurthe-et-Moselle	78.8	(men)	84.2	(women)	
Indicator	14	 		 		 		
Name	 NEET	 NA	 NA	
Indicator	
24_1	
		 		 		
Name	 Total	population	 242,386	 28,273	
Indicator	28	 		 		 		
Name	 People	at	risk	of	poverty	or	social	exclusion	 CA	Lens-Liévin:	25.9%	CA	Hénin	Carvin:	23.5%	CA	de	Béthune-Bruay,	Artois-Lys	Romane:	20.2%	
16.1%	
Table	3:	Indicators	that	should	be	provided	in	the	national	case	study	reports.	Source:	INSEE	Recensement	2016,	exploitation	principale,	issues	de	https://statistiques-locales.insee.fr/#c=report&chapter=empopact&report=r03&selgeo1=epci.245701404&selgeo2=fe.1	Isabelle	Pigeron-Piroth,	University	of	Luxembourg		 	
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6.2 Additional	information	
		
	
Map	2:	The	reshaping	of	the	French	industrial	landscape:	most	dynamic	industrial	sectors	and	creation	of	industrial	employment	for	10	years.	Source:	
https://www.lemonde.fr/economie/article/2019/03/30/les-zones-periurbaines-viviers-de-creations-
d-emplois-industriels_5443511_3234.html				 	
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Authority	 Competencies	 Main	taxes	&	sources	of	
revenues	State	 — State	obligations:	constitution,	justice,	security,	defence,	foreign	policy,	fiscal	policy	
— Economy,	trade	and	industry	
— Education	
— Transport	
— Strategic	orientation:	spatial	planning,	housing	
— Environment	and	energy	
— Immigration	
— Agriculture,	fisheries	and	forestry	
— Culture,	tourism,	sport	
— Media	and	communication	
— Equal	opportunities	
— Income	tax	
— VAT	(revenues	and	rates)	
— Corporate	tax	
— Social	security,	health	care	services		
— Fuel	and	broadcast	media	tax	
Region	(13	since	the	territorial	reform	in	2015)	 — Economic	development	— Spatial	planning		— Environment	and	sustainable	land-use	planning	
— Transport,	mobility	and	communication	networks	
— Management	of	ERDF	and	INTERREG	programmes	
— Education	(high	schools,	universities,	vocational	training	etc.)	
— Culture,	social	life,	youth,	sports,	leisure	
— Tourism,	heritage	protection		
— Financing	housing		
— General	operating	grant	(DGF)	
Département	(95	for	metropolitan	France,	101	including	Corsica	and	outermost	regions	and	territories)	
— Solidarity,	social	affairs	(management	of	social	assistance	including	allocation	in	case	of	unemployment	and	support	for	housing)	
— Social	and	medical-social	action	(childhood	protection,	adoption,	retirement	homes,	homes	for	the	disabled,	disability	compensation)	
— Management	of	EU	Social	Fund		
— Education	(e.g.	colleges)	
— Culture,	social	life,	youth,	sports,	leisure	
— Regional	tourism,	heritage	protection,	libraries,	museums	etc.	
— Land	planning,	infrastructure,	transport	(rural	facilities,	land	development,	rural	waterways	and	roads,	secondary	roads,	fishing	&	commercial	seaports)	
— Environment	(waste,	water)	
— Large	infrastructure	items	(aerodromes)	
— Indirect	economic	development		
— General	operating	grant	(DGF)	
— Local	taxation	(property	tax	on	buildings,	companies’	value-added	contribution	(CVAE),	flat-rate	tax	on	network	businesses);	
— Transferred	taxation	(property	transfer	tax,	share	of	tax	on	insurance	contracts,	share	of	domestic	consumption	tax	on	energy	products);	
— State	grants.	
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— Security:	traffic,	delinquency,	fire	and	rescue	services	ÉPCI	(Établissement	
Public	de	Coopération	
Intercommunale)16	(1,258	with	their	own	taxation	on	01.01.2019,	including:	
— 21	métropoles;	
— 13	urban	communities;	
— 223	agglomeration	communities;	
— and	1,001	associations	of	municipalities)	
— Municipal	competences	in	terms	of	water	and	sanitation	from	01.01.2020	onwards	
— Development	and	management	of	local	public	services;	
— Collective	heading	of	local	development	projects		
— General	operating	grant	(DGF);	
— Depending	on	their	members’	choice,	ÉPCI	may	have	their	own	taxation:		For	ÉPCI	without	their	own	taxation:	budgetary	contribution	from	municipalities	or	from	taxed	contribution;	ÉPCI	with	own	taxation:	
ü FPU,	CET,	IFER,	TASCOM	
ü Additional	taxation:	local	direct	taxes	on	households,	rates	voted	by	the	ÉPCI;	and,	shared	with	the	municipalities:	tax	on	companies’	added	value	+	IFER	+	TASCOM	
Métropole	or	urban	agglomeration	(urban	context)17	(with	more	than	400K	inhabitants)	(21	on	01.01.2019,	incl.	2	with	a	particular	status:	Paris	and	Marseille)18	
— Economic	development	and	attractiveness	
— Transport,	esp.	public	transport	 — General	operating	grant	(DGF)	
Association	of	municipalities	(rural	to	peri-urban	context)	(with	minimum	15K	inhabitants,	except	in	mountain	areas:	5K	inhabitants)	
— Local	urbanism	plans	
— Internet	network	
— Management	of	public	facilities	(e.g.	sport,	culture)	
— Economic	development	
— Promotion	of	tourism		
— Reception	areas	for	travellers	
— Aquatic	environment	management,	flood	prevention	(GEMAPI)	
— Water,	sanitation,	collection	&	treatment	of	household	waste	(as	from	2020	onwards).	
— General	operating	grant	(DGF)		
— Contribution	from	associated	municipalities	
Municipality	(or	
arrondissement	in	urban	context)	(34,970	on	01.01.2019)19	
— General	competence	clause	(clause	
générale	de	compétence)20	
— Social	action	(e.g.	childcare	facilities,	homes	for	the	elderly)	
— Training	(e.g.	school	workers)	
— Local	business	tax	
— Local	taxes:	housing	tax,	property	tax	on	built	properties,	on	undeveloped	properties,	territorial	
 16	This	table	focuses	on	associations	of	municipalities	and	of	agglomeration;	it	does	not	address	urban	communities	(i.e.	more	than	250K	inhabitants).	17	This	table	focuses	on	metropolitan	France	(i.e.	excluding	outermost	regions	and	territories	as	well	as	communities	with	special	status.	i.e.	Corsica	since	2018.	It	does	not	address	the	specific	situation	of	large	cities	either	(i.e.	Paris/métropole	du	Grand	Paris,	Lyon,	and	Marseille).	18	The	métropole	of	Lyon	is	a	territorial	community,	and	not	a	métropole	strictly	speaking.	19	https://www.amf.asso.fr/page-communes-nouvelles-une-dynamique-confortee-d'avenir/39009	20	The	general	 competence	 clause	allows	public	 authorities	 to	 act	 in	 areas	 that	 are	not	primarily	within	their	field	of	competence,	meaning	that	the	list	of	competences	in	it	is	not	limited.	
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— Infrastructure	management	(e.g.	schools,	sport	and	culture	facilities)	and	local	transportation	
— Civil	registry	
— Gas,	electricity	networks	(can	be	managed	at	the	level	of	the	association	of	municipalities)	
— Municipal	roads	
— Culture,	social	life,	youth,	sports	
— Spatial	planning	(e.g.	local	urbanism	plans	(PLU),	joint	planning	zones	(ZAC),	construction	work	permits)	
— Local	habitat	plan	(PLH)	
— Indirect	aids	to	economic	development	
— Security:	traffic	and	parking,	delinquency,	city	police	
— Organisation	of	elections	
economic	contribution	(companies’	territorial	contribution	+	companies’	value-added	contribution	
— Council	tax	
— Depending	on	municipalities’	characteristics,	the	general	operating	grant	(DGF)	is	allocated	under	specific	funds:	
— Urban	Solidarity	and	Social	Cohesion	Grant	(DSUCS)	(10K+	inhabitants);	
— The	Rural	Solidarity	Grant	(RSD)	(small	municipalities);	
— National	Equalisation	Grant	(DNP).	
Table	4:	Distribution	of	competences	in	France	Realisation:	Tom	Royer,	University	of	Luxembourg;		Sources:	Assemblée	nationale,	2019;	Comersis,	2019;	Direction	de	l’information	légale	et	administrative,	2019;	Assemblée	des	départements	de	France,	2019;	MOT,	2019.	
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The	RELOCAL	Project	EU	Horizon	2020	research	project	‘Resituating	the	local	in	cohesion	and	territorial	
development’	–RELOCAL	aims	to	identify	factors	that	condition	local	accessibility	of	European	policies,	local	abilities	to	articulate	needs	and	equality	claims	and	local	capacities	for	exploiting	European	opportunity	structures.		In	the	past,	especially	since	the	economic	and	financial	crisis,	the	European	Social	Model	has	proven	to	be	challenged	by	the	emergence	of	spatially	unjust	results.	The	RELOCAL	hypothesis	is	that	processes	of	localisation	and	place-based	public	policy	can	make	a	positive	contribution	to	spatial	justice	and	democratic	empowerment.	The	research	is	based	on	33	case	studies	in	13	different	European	countries	that	exemplify	development	challenges	in	terms	of	spatial	justice.	The	cases	were	chosen	to	allow	for	a	balanced	representation	of	different	institutional	contexts.	Based	on	case	study	findings,	project	partners	will	draw	out	the	factors	that	influence	the	impact	of	place-based	approaches	or	actions	from	a	comparative	perspective.	The	results	are	intended	to	facilitate	a	greater	local	orientation	of	cohesion,	territorial	development	and	other	EU	policies.		
The	RELOCAL	project	runs	from	October	2016	until	September	2020.		Read	more	at	https://relocal.eu		Project	Coordinator:								University	of	Eastern	Finland		 	 	 	 									Contact:	Dr.	Petri	Kahila	(petri.kahila@uef.fi)			
